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THE USE OF INTERACTIVE MODELS TO FORMULATE 
MANAGERS' PROBLEMS AND TO IDENTIFY DECISION AIDS
ABSTRACT
This thesis describes a research inquiry into models which could be used in an interactive 
manner for formulating problems and exploring managers’ needs for decision aids. It reviews 
a wide range of literature in Operational Research Methodology, Models and Games, and then 
argues the case that what managers want are models which could allow them to reflect on the 
way they manage process and not those which simulate that process.
A two phase practical study was carried out in association with two departments of a large 
organisation in which a group of managers were interested in the basic aims of the study and 
willing to cooperate. The aim was to research their managerial environment, seeking ways to 
improve management control of the processes which they do not directly involve themselves in, 
except by managing those who do.
In phase one, Bowen’s Problem Formulation Methodology was used to structure and feed 
back the data obtained from managers. The Methodology proved to be a very effective tool to 
help both the Operational Researcher and the Problem Owners to communicate and identify 
potential problem areas and failures in communications and purposeful actions.
In phase two, a computer - based system was developed for the General Manager of one 
department to help him in the recording of and access to essential features of his current prob­
lems and communications about them. The system could be extended as a planning schedule 
and process control held in common by a management group, a decision support system for the 
department as a whole.
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“ Learning has to be an adventure, otherwise i t ’s stillborn. W hat you learn 
at a given moment ought to depend on things tha t come together by chance, 
and it ought to continue in tha t way from one conjunction to another, a learning 
by reshaping, a learning through pleasurable activity. ”
“ I enjoy all systems if they can be grasped in their entirety, like a plaything 
in the hand. If they get complicated, they worry me. Too much of the world 
has come together in the wrong place and how am I to redispose it. ”
EUels CanettiiDie Provinz des Menschen, 
Aufzeichnungen 1942 - 1972,
Carl Hanser Verlag, München, 1973.
Modified version of a translation 
by Joachin Neugroschel,
Pan Books Ltd., 1986.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The initial intention for the area of research described in this thesis was to 
examine a specific class of games, namely, ‘learning games’ as defined by Bowen 
(1978a). It was planned to set criteria for a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ game, and to find 
out their proper role in the process of research and training at top managerial 
level.
This demanded a coverage of a wide range of literature about games, learn­
ing processes for top managers and the problems and complexities of their tasks, 
and how one might provide them with an Operational Research (OR) type aid. 
The basic aim of the literature reviews was to develop ideas based on published 
research as guidelines for any possible further developments.
Chapter 2 is concerned with the process and practice of Operational Re­
search. It argues the case that because OR analysts need to work closely to 
decision makers, they have to understand decision making activities in the sys­
tems under study. Moreover, analysts are expected to face ‘ill - structured’ 
rather than ‘well - defined’ problems. In the latter, a vast range of techniques is 
available to help the analyst in his problem solving activity.In the former, there 
is no way to obtain an ‘optimal solution’, and the OR analyst’s role become 
that of ‘helper’ rather than as a ‘technician’. In other words he will be engaged 
in a ‘facilitative process’ to enhance his clients’ understanding of the ‘messy’
- 1 1  -
problems they face.
The chapter reports three problem formulation methodologies developed by 
leading Operational Researchers and aimed at helping OR analysts to structure 
the unstructured real world problems. The first is developed by Eden and 
his colleagues, [ see Eden, Jones, and Sims (1979) ], and is supported by a 
computer package which helps in representing the problem owner’s perception 
of his difficulties. The second is the Checkland methodology which is also a ‘soft 
systems methodology’ for ‘inquiry’ rather than ‘optimization’, [ see Checkland
(1981) j. It makes use of a ‘root definition’ concept of systems of concern. 
The third methodology which is described in the chapter is Bowen’s problem 
formulation methodology, [ see Bowen (1984) ]. It is a qualitative modelling 
approach which I found effective in building conceptual models by making use 
of a notation specifically devised for this purpose.
Because it is very important to represent the real system under study 
in some type of model which can be m anipulated, chapter 3 deals with the 
implementation of OR models. It examines different classes of models and 
points out that, although a large number of models is available for assisting 
managers in their decision making process, very few are implemented, hence an 
‘implementation problem’. The reasons for this problem are investigated in a 
number of studies which concluded that m anagers’ participation in any model 
building process, will increase the likelihood for successful implementation. It 
is believed tha t what managers need are models which enable them to reflect 
on the way they manage process and not those which simulate that process.
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These models may in fact be ones which lead to problem formulation rather 
than problem solving. They must enhance a m anager’s understanding of his 
problems by learning through the models.
It was initially thought tha t an Operational Research activity, namely gam­
ing, discussed in chapter 4, would help in the top - level managers’ appreciation 
of their tasks. The literature survey indicated tha t the type of games available 
are those which simulate a process such as ‘inventory system’. They are useful 
for lower level management training, but not as vehicle for planning, commu­
nication, and control in an organisation, which are the prime concerns of top 
management. Hence, before proceeding to develop any type of game for real 
application, the chapter outlined the limitations of the available games. This 
conclusion, together with the experience gained and outlined in chapters 2 and 
3, changed the emphasis of the original research programme. W hat is needed 
may or may not be a game in the traditional sense. It would be an inquiry into 
managers’ problems, to learn what they are, their main features, and how to 
cope with difficulties. To carry out the research, a need arose for a real envi­
ronment in which managers would be willing to ‘gain’ from the broad planned 
approach /  experiment outlined in chapter 4. A positive response came from a 
local organisation which resulted in a successful experiment.
Before, during, and after the interaction, it became necessary to examine 
an area which has received much attention in recent years, that of decision sup­
port systems (DSS). Chapter 5 is concerned with DSS regarded as interactive 
computer - based systems aimed at supporting rather than replacing the man­
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agement decision making process. It is generally held that DSS are needed to 
deal with ill - structured problems in order to improve the efficiency and effec­
tiveness of organisations. They differ from other information processing systems 
such as Electronic Data Processing (EDP) systems and Management Informa­
tion Systems (MIS). The chapter develops the argument that at the early stages 
of research and applications in DSS, there were difficulties in both hardware and 
software. Recently, however, major advances in computers, colour graphics and 
telecommunication networks makes it possible to develop manager operated 
DSS. It was also recognised that DSS suffer from almost the same ‘implemen­
tation problem’ already discussed in chapter 3. An ‘Evolutionary Strategy’ is 
seen as the best one to increase the likelihood of successful implementation.
Chapters 6 and 7 test and extend the ideas outlined in the preceeding 
chapters in a real - life environment. Chapter 6 describes the development of the 
interaction with the client group. The study first concentrated on technological 
and organisational features of the systems involved, which proved to be an 
essential stage in the analyst learning process. It also prevented narrowing the 
scope of the study to a specific direction at an early stage ( often an attem pt to 
fit a mathematical model ). A ‘variety’ of key managers were involved, which 
contributed to providing a rich picture of the complexities of their tasks and 
the extent of their ill - structured problems.
To structure the data obtained, and to represent it in a form which could 
easily be communicated to the managers in order to enhance their learning 
process and to explore further problems in their organisation, Bowen’s problem
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formulation methodology [ see chapter 2 ] was chosen as a suitable device. The 
application proved to be a very successful process. It enabled the analyst to 
compare the wide range of experiences and perceptions of different managers in 
the same organisation; not surprisingly, they had not perceived their organisa­
tion and its environment in the same way. The process of building conceptual 
models was not an easy one, as it was difficult to decide what to include in 
any diagram in order to interpret how each key manager saw situations of his 
concern.
Nevertheless, very im portant outcomes of the interaction are pointed out. 
First, the changing nature of the problem perceived by the client. W hat was 
initially thought to be a major weakness in their information systems, changed 
to become an awareness of the lack of proper communication and control. The 
diagrams helped the managers to learn new things about their organisation. 
Further, an unexpected outcome was that, at some stage during the interaction, 
the ‘student’ experimenting for his thesis became accepted as a ‘consultant’, 
despite the fact that he was not employed by the organisation. The consultant 
and his client, were able then to decide which of the many problems identified, 
might be considered for further exploration.
This exploration was in the form of an experimental decision aid which 
came as a consequence of the joint learning process discused in chapter 6 and 
as a second learning stage for management. This decision aid is outlined in 
chapter 7. The ideal was to provide a computerised communication facility 
which would help to integrate the scattered pieces of information throughout
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the clients’ department. However, a number of difficulties were obvious, such 
as the immensity of the job given the analyst’s limited time, and the fact that 
not all managers were prepared to share their ‘private’ concerns with others 
at their level or above. Due to all this, it was agreed that a personal system 
should be developed for the General Manager’s use only. The specific objective 
in mind was to give him a feel about how a likely DSS [ not a traditional 
game ] might help him and others in his organisation in their prime tasks of 
communication and control. The system will have an advantage of providing a 
learning environment.
The interaction process with the General Manager indicated his substantial 
support for the proposed system. Additional support for the ideas reported in 
this chapter and others came from literature which was not initially available 
and which is therefore reviewed in chapter 7.
Finally, chapter 8 provides conclusions of this research and lays down fun­
damentals for further research. In summary, this research emphasises that 
managers live in a world of ‘ill - defined’ problems [ see chapter 2 ] for which 
neither ‘traditional games’ [ see chapter 4 ] nor standard OR techniques can 
provide ‘solutions’. A proper problem - formulation is a most essential stage, 
and needs a structured methodology to aid communication between analyst and 
client. Managers will learn through the conceptual models which can be built 
if rich data can be obtained.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE PROCESS AND PRACTICE OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
2.1 Introduction  and Conclusion
In this chapter a sample of the literature on Operational Research (OR) 
process and practice is reviewed. The sample is chosen in relation to the impor­
tance for the research programme, namely the ideas found to be relevant at a 
later stage. The concepts of problem, problem - solving, problem - formulation, 
and the role of techniques in OR are examined. Because of the particular im­
portance of the problem - formulation stage in the OR process, as it manifested 
itself in the research programme, three of the available problem - formulation 
methodologies are introduced here with the view that there is no obvious ‘best’. 
The choice of a particular methodology to aid the analyst in a particular study 
will remain a subjective choice.
2.2 OR as a Scientific D iscip line
The official definition of Operational Research (OR) as approved by the 
U.K. OR Society up to 1983 was:
“ Operational Research is the application of the methods of science to com­
plex problems arising in the direction and management of large systems of men, 
machines, materials and money in industry, business, government, and defence. 
The distinctive approach is to develop a scientific model of the system, incor-
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porating measurement of factors such as chance and risk, with which to predict 
and compare the outcomes of alternative decisions, strategies or controls. The 
purpose is to help management determine its policy and actions scientifically.”
The above definition has been widely debated and various OR practitioners 
have interpreted OR in different senses. Bowen (1975a), for example, argues 
that: “ Operational Research is the process of giving aid to decision makers 
through measurement ” . He adds; “ As more complicated systems are studied, 
less precise measurements, such as classification by sets and linguistic definition, 
become of increasing importance ” . Tomlinson (1974) thinks that: “ OR will 
never be a comfortable profession with well - defined boundaries; if it ever 
becomes so, it will indeed have failed ” . Muller - Merbach (1986) suggests tha t 
OR is “ ... how to best design and operate man - machine systems ... ” .
The scientific nature of OR which appeared three times in the now dis­
carded definition, is also emphasised by Eilon (1975) who saw OR as a ‘scientific 
activity’ because “ ... the elements of formulating a hypothesis, of prediction 
and of experimentation are clearly discernible in the OR process ... ” . Rivett 
(1975) in a feedback to Eilon’s argument distinguished the ‘laboratory scien­
tists’ who are “ ... fortunate in tha t laboratories are machines for uncoupling 
an experiment from its environment ... ” ; and ‘OR scientists’ who are 
“ ... affecting and affected by the decision structure they are studying...” . 
Others, for example Dando et al (1977), argued tha t OR is a “ ... technology 
equivalent in many ways to the various branches of engineering ...” .
Despite the above views about the scientific nature of OR, Hickling (1982) 
questions the ‘scientific m ethod’ itself, which he sees as ‘very difficult to use’ by
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being described as a ‘linear process’ by the sequence observation, interpretation, 
and theory.
Generally, it is outside the scope of this thesis to engage in the debate about 
the definition or the scientific nature of OR, but the wide range of perceptions 
of its role is relevant.
2.3 The Process o f OR
The central characterstic of early Operational Research is tha t of ‘problem 
- solving’ . The OR analyst, faced by a ‘well - defined’ problem, had the task of 
building a model of that problem. The model, very often a mathematical one, 
was then solved in order to find an ‘optim al’ alternative out of a set of courses 
of action which are available to the ‘decision - maker’ whom the OR analyst is 
serving.
The above process of problem - solving is interpreted in different ways 
by OR practitioners. Tocher (1961), for example, distinguished the following 
eight phases: exploration of the problem, model building, model testing, model 
solution, check solution, sell solution, implementation, and monitor situation.
Bowen (1977) adopted a systems approach to the process of OR based on 
his broad interpretation of OR as a process of giving aid to decision - makers 
through measurement. Another systems interpretation came from Sagasti and 
Mitroff (1973) who argued that: “ ... the activity of OR is a system with 
several component subsystems ... ” . They added; “ These subsystems are of 
a conceptual nature and correspond to some phase of the operations research
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process Scholz (1984) interpreted Operational Research and Managenent 
Science “ as a hierarchic system which consists of two complex layers to be 
labelled ‘methodology’ and ‘technology’ ” . Buzacott (1982) argues that “ ... any 
general consensus on the nature of the OR process seems to have disappeared’ 
He distinguishes three schools of thought on the practice of OR: Operations 
Research, Operational Research, and Systems Analysis.
Because of the wide range of experiences and interpretations of the OR 
process, Conway (1984) suggested an alternative model, ‘the dynamic model’, 
which he saw as “ ... a new paradigm for the process of OR, viewing it as a 
dynamic, on - going process of interaction between the Operational Research 
group, the organisation and the environment ” .
Generally, there is an on - going debate on the process and practice of OR. 
It is mainly stimulated by the activities of the U.K. Process of Operational 
Research Study Group which helps to generate new ideas to bridge the gap 
between academic and practical OR.
2.4 The P ractice o f OR
2.4.1 D ecision M aking
In many situations, OR practitioners need to work closely to decision mak­
ers in order to help them to resolve ‘problematical situations’ in their organi­
sations. It is important for them to understand decision making activities in 
those organisations so tha t their advice can be seen as relevant to the decision 
makers’ needs.
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I shall discuss some views about decision and the decision making process. 
W hite (1975) differentiates between ‘primary decisions’ which are taken by the 
‘client’ and the ‘secondary decisions’ which the ‘OR analyst’ takes on the sort 
of technique(s) he has to use to deal with certain problem situations. Ackoff 
(1977) argues tha t the concept of decision “ ... contains five components and 
three types of parameters ” . The components are: the decision maker, the 
available course of action, the possible outcomes of the courses of action, the 
environment and the constraints. The parameters are: the probabilities of 
choice, the efficiency of each available course of action, the relative value of 
each outcome.
Bowen (1975a) saw no difference between ‘choice’ and ‘decision’ although, 
he added, “ ... when we choose, we have only ‘decided to decide’ : we can 
change our minds ” . In a different place, Bowen (1981b) argues tha t “ When a 
decision is made, it is as if there had been an assessment by those responsible 
for the decision, based on their values, on the weightings they would place on 
different criteria, and on their perceptions of what future events might occur and 
what consequences of possible actions might be ” . As to the aid of numerical 
measurement in the above process, he adds; “ It would be very satisfactory 
if numerical measurements could be made of the appropriate subjective 
variables involved ” . Nevertheless he was sceptical of the practice; “ Most 
procedures which aim to provide models of good decision - making propose ways 
of establishing such numbers and lay down normative rules for processing these”.
-  21 -
It can be argued that the basic aim in carrying an OR study on behalf of 
the decision maker, is not to ‘autom ate’ the decision, but to ‘aid’ the decision 
maker.
2.4.2 The R ole o f Techniques in OR
Because OR was first started to deal with ‘tactical problems’ and used 
mathematical procedures to solve them, it was largely thought of as a branch 
or mathematics. Continuous efforts to clarify the process and practice of OR 
were made and the role of techniques as part of the whole OR process was 
examined by many OR professionals.
In 1961 Tocher summarised the reaction to mathematical programming by 
the witticism “ ... I have a solution - now you find a problem to fit it ” . Ackoff 
(1962) also recognised the need for OR to give more thought about problem - 
formulation. He drew attention to the fact that for OR to be successful 
activity , it must be “ ... problem - oriented, not technique - oriented ” . 
However, he added; “ This is not to say that sophisticated mathematics cannot 
serve (OR) well. It can and does, but only if at leaat four conditions are satisfied:
1. if the problem is properly formulated;
2. if the appropriate techniques are applied;
3. if a proper measure of effectiveness is used; and
4. if the results are implemented ” .
Ackoff urged then tha t research should be concentrating on “ ... developing 
the ability to handle all kinds of relevant variables ” in the problem situation 
rather than distorting the problem to fit a mathematical model in order to get
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an ‘optimal - solution’.
Because problems are not ‘well - defined’ and clearly formulated, an in­
evitable distortion will take place when they are modelled for solution purposes. 
Support for AckofiT’s arguments came from Bowen (1970) who pointed out the 
risk in distorting problems; “ There is a growing danger tha t problems will be 
modelled to fit techniques, which seem able to cope with a large and complex 
set of data, without realizing that some aspects of the problem are not being 
quantified at all ” . In other places, Bowen provides further evidence in support 
of the above ideas, and the scope of mathematics in OR. Bowen (1972) pressed 
the need for a “ ... developed mathematical language appropriate to the tcisk 
of defining a large - scale complex of systems ” . Bowen (1975a) argued that 
Operational Research can never just be the sum of techniques, mathematical 
and non - mathematical, since it is essentially a collaborative, interactive and 
adaptive process ” . Bowen (1975b) outlines the techniques available to the OR 
analyst and their potential weaknesses.
Through the process of modelling by the use of mathematical techniques, 
OR analysts are seeking an ‘optimal solution’ to the problem situation under­
study. Because a model is only an abstracted form of the problem situation, 
it implies tha t when it is solved; “ The optimal solution of a model is not an 
optimal solution of a problem unless the model is a perfect representation of the 
problem ” . See Ackoff (1977). Ackoff adds; “ ... optimal solutions deteriorate 
because of changes in both the systems that employ them and their environ­
ments ” . He wants OR to “ ... engage in designing decision systems tha t learn 
and adapt well rather than in producing optimal solutions tha t do not ” .
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Additional support for the above ideas follows from Bonder (1979) who 
questions the relevance of mathematical techniqus; he argues “ The relevance 
of current mathematical development in OR is continually questioned and, of 
perhaps more significance, the techniques and methods are being developed 
by individuals who have more disciplinary allegiance to mathematics and eco­
nomics than to operations research ” .
More recently, the report of the commission on the future practice of OR 
(1986) suggests that: “ The commission found little explicit use of those m ath­
ematical techniques which are most commonly associated with O.R. ( for exam­
ple, mathematical programming and queuing theory). These and the insights 
they offer, along with many other technical devices,-help to constitute a tool - 
kit of methods from which the practitioner may draw as need dictates ” .
To conclude, there is a strong evidence in the literature that many ‘optimal 
solutions’ to ‘problem situations’ have failed. It is likely that one major reason 
behind tha t failure is that problems were not thoroughly formulated: had they 
been so, it would have been either difficult or impossible to use mathematical 
optimising techniques.
Clearly, many OR researchers are carrying out their work in a way which 
broadly follows the views expressed above. However, whether the processes that 
are being used are yet adequate is far from certain.
The rest of this chapter is devoted to arguments related to the practice of 
OR and the importance of the problem formulation phase in it.
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2.4 .3  Princip les o f OR Practice
The wide spread views and experiences about the process and practice of 
operational research have led practitioners in the field to lay down principles for 
the practice of OR. These principles are mainly based on personal experience 
and practice in dealing with real world problem situations.
First, in a Presidential Adress to the U.K. OR Society, Tomlinson (1974) 
proposed the following six principles for effective OR.
1. “The partnership principle”
2. “The catalytic principle”
3. “The interpenetration principle”
4. “The independence principle”
5. “The catholicity principle”
6. “The balance principle”
The above principles were implemented in the management of an in - house 
OR group, and found very effective.
Ackoff (1979a) and (1979b) has published two papers which provoked a 
critical debate in OR circles. He criticized the traditional ‘problem - solving ’ 
paradigm because it only helps to “ ... compare alternative decisions or decision 
rules that are ‘given’ ” . He sees the paradigm as only “ ... a starting - point of 
OR’s development, not as its end - point ” . ‘Problem solving’ paradigm as seen 
by Ackoff consists of two parts: “ predicting the future and preparing for 
it ” . He adds; “ Perfect prediction is only possible under two sets of conditions; 
first, when nothing changes.... second (when) the behaviour of tha t which we
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predict occurs in accordance with deterministic causal laws, and that we know 
perfectly these laws and the structure of whatever it is tha t we are predicting,--”
Because OR mainly took place in ‘turbulent environments’ in which ‘perfect 
prediction’ was impossible, Ackoff proposed an alternative paradigm for OR, 
th e  p a ra d ig m  of p lan n in g  . He based it on the following principles:
1. “The participative principle”
2. “The continuity principle”
3. “The holistic principle”
I found little difference between Ackoff’s and Tomlinson’s principles. They 
are both based on a long practical experience in researching and managing OR 
projects.
There are two main roles which the OR analyst may assume during the 
interaction with a potential client. Eden and Sims (1979) refer to these.
First, th e  tech n ic ian  role, “ ... in which, somebody else (other than the 
OR man), must be responsible for formulating the problem, for deciding which 
criteria of evaluation are significant ... ” . Second, th e  help  ro le, in which the 
OR m an’s function “ ... is to assist or enable his client in working with his 
problem, using all appropriate abilities and techniques at his command ” . Eden
(1982) saw the process which resulted from the second role as the fa c u lta tiv e  
p rocess. Gault (1984) goes along with Eden by stressing the new framework 
of OR. He said: “ A new OR framework is emerging. An im portant aspect of 
this new framework is an understanding that the operational researcher’s role is 
to help others to solve their problems themselves. This is in contrast with the
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more traditional view which emphasises solving the problem for the decision 
maker, and giving him this fact in the form of the ‘optimal solution’ ” .
Because of the sense of ‘crisis’ in the practice of OR, as some refer to it,
[ e.g. Checkland (1983) ], the British OR Society established in June 1983, 
a ‘Commision on the Future Practice of Operational Research’, from whose 
findings I have quoted earlier with regard to techniques. Its purpose was:
a. To describe the state of OR in practice
b. To make recommendations to the OR Council about how the society 
might better support practitioners.
I am only concerned here with the commission findings about OR in prac­
tice. In fact, the commission found “ ... the nature of O.R. in practice more 
striking for its variety than for its uniformity ... ” . The commission found 
significant amounts of OR in practice with one or more of the following aims:
- “ to help structure ‘messes’ or messy problems” ;
- “ to research into the facts of an uncertain topic” ;
- “ to help understanding of a sphere of activity” ;
- “ to design systems ( usually of a non - routine nature )” ;
- “ to facilitate change” ;
- “ to help introduce new technologies and ideas ( particularly at present 
in the information technology field)” ;
- “ to provide an independent view of a contentious issue” ;
- “ to provide technical solutions to technical problems” .
The im portant benefits of OR, as the commission found, “ ... stem from 
enhancing the clien t’s understanding of his ow n problem s ” . ( My
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emphasis ) which is based on Eden and Sims (1979) and Gault (1984) arguments 
tha t an OR analyst has to assume a ‘help role’ rather than a ‘technician role’.
I shall return to this point when I examine the ‘problem formulation’ stage 
in the OR process to find out what research has been done in problem formu­
lation to help the OR analyst in his ‘help’ role. I shall link that to my research 
findings in the experiment carried out which is described in detail in chapters 
6 and 7 of this thesis.
2 .4 .4  T h e  C o n cep ts  of P ro b le m  a n d  P ro b le m  Solving
The concepts of ‘problem’ and ‘problem - solving’ are widely debated in 
the literature. It can be argued that there is a shift from ‘solving’ the client’s 
problem to ‘helping’ him to understand the ‘problem - situation’.
First, 1 shall examine the concept ‘p ro b le m ’. Ackoff (1977) argues that 
“ Problems are elements abstracted from messes, therefore, problems are to 
messes what atoms are to planets ” . He believes that managers are confronted 
with ‘dynamic situations’ which he calls m esses. Bowen (1975a) supported 
Ackoff’s argument and commented on messes by stressing that they are prob­
lems, “ ... which are not closed and are not solvable. They are manifestations 
of the need to choose in situations which can never be fully analysed nor even 
represented. The choice, when made and implemented, can never be identified 
as g o o d  or b a d  in any absolute sense, since the act of changing the situation 
changes the environment in which any such judgement has to be made ” .
Eden and Sims (1979) have talked about “ ... an objectively defined prob­
lem which is assumed to be self evident to all intelligent people, ...” . However,
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they expressed their belief that it is very rare to find a ‘self evident’ problem in 
real organisations. Ackoff (1981) returns to state clearly what he means by a 
problem. “ By a problem  we mean a situation that satisfies three conditions: 
first, a decision - making individual or group has alternative courses of action 
available; second, the choice made can have a significant effect; and third, the 
decision maker has some doubt as to which alternative should be selected ” .
Checkland (1981), trying to outline clearly the logic behind his research 
programme and his ‘soft - systems methodology’ argued, “ ... it was not possible 
to take for granted the concept of ‘a problem’ and the activity of trying to solve 
it ” . He refers to: Structured problem s, “ ... which can be explicitly stated 
in a language which implies that a theory concerning their solution is 
available ... ” . U nstructured problem s, “ ... which are manifest in a
feeling of unease but which cannot be explicitly stated without this appearing 
to oversimplify the situation ... ” . Checkland prefers to deal with ‘problem 
situations’ rather than ‘problems’.
Stainton (1984a) saw no unique way of looking at problems; he argues that 
“ Problems may be viewed from many different angles and in many different 
ways. The order in which facts are collected, the attitudes of the people involved 
in the problem, the climate in which the problem finds itself to be, all play their 
parts in determining what the problem is perceived to be and how it is 
tackled ” .
In a private communication with Professor Bowen, he commented on ‘w ell 
- defined’ and ‘ill - defined’ problems. He thought that: A well - defined 
problem may be stated because one is comfortable with it, even though it is
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not the problem that should be tackled. But assuming that there has been an 
effort made to formulate the problem, it would be well - defined if:
a. all controllable variables, and all uncontrollable ones that effect the 
system being modified ( or created ) or are affected by it, are measurable in 
absolute or statistical ( probability terms );
b. all relationships are describable and are understood;
c. the necessary data can be collected.
Generally, it looks as if what could be a ‘problem’ for some researcher, 
might be a ‘solution’ to another one. The literature evidence suggests that 
the OR analyst should not start immediately a ‘solution’ process without a 
proper identification of the causes of the likely problem(s): and knowing what 
the problem really is may be all the client needs. W hat will follow is a broad 
discussion of the concept of ‘p ro b lem  - so lv ing ’.
Because Ackoff (1977) prefered to talk about ‘messes’ rather than ‘prob­
lems’, and he thinks there is no optimal solution to the mess, he argues that: 
“ ... the sum of the optimal solutions to each component problem considered 
separately is not an optimal solution to the mess. This follows from the fact 
tha t the behaviour of the mess depends more on how the solutions to its com­
ponent problems in te ra c t than on how they act independently of each 
other ” . Ackoff (1981) identifies three kinds of things that can be done about 
problems - they can be resolved, solved or dissolved.
Mitchell and Tomlinson (1979) argued in the same sense “ ... to talk of 
solving problems is usually to talk of the impossible. The solution usually gen­
erates other problems, the better solutions being those which put off significant
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new problems longest. Nor can one often talk about defining a problem. Rather 
one defines some activity which one hopes will contribute to solving 
a problem ” .
Since Stainton (1979) thinks that problems may be viewed from different 
angles, he talked about s lip p e ry  so lu tio n s  . He argued “ Solutions are slippery 
and must change with time. It is much harder to convince management of the 
single, final solution; better to design a solution with which they interface and 
with which they feel a part. Solutions are as much about conviction to act as 
they are about saying what should be done ” . Fripp (1982a) referred to the 
concept of ‘problem - solving style’ which in his words: “ ... is introduced as a 
means of understanding the emphasis placed upon different aspects of the O.R. 
process ” . Fripp concludes that; “ ( There are ) major differences in problem - 
solving style between fellows of Operational Research and line managers, ...” .
A final comment comes from Miiller - Merbach (1986): “ ... the problem is 
not solved in numbers! it is solved not earlier than when the manager’s decision 
is carried out ” .
2.5 P ro b le m  F o rm u la tio n
2.5.1 In tro d u c tio n
As shown in the arguments outlined in the preceding sections, ‘problem 
formulation’ or as some call it ‘problem structuring’ or ‘problem definition’, is 
a very im portant stage in the OR process. The need for proper research to 
develop methodologies to assist the analyst in his task is not new. However,
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the work to meet tha t need had not started until the early 1970’s.
For example, Ackoff (1962) called for research to be carried out in order 
to ‘solve’ one of the ‘unsolved problems’ in ‘problem solving’ namely; “ How 
should we ( OR researchers ) go about determining what a sponsor’s problem 
really is?
Bowen on a number of occasions has drawn attention to this issue and 
encouraged research to devise methods which can help the analyst to structure 
and explore what the client’s problem(s) is. His own research will be discussed 
later. First, Bowen (1970) named three levels at which Operational Research 
may structure problems and describe them logically;
“ At the lowest level such structuring may provide models which enable 
decisions to be reached; at the intermediate levels it provides models which 
enable useful advice to be given to decision - makers; at the highest level it 
can perhaps help by casting light on what the problems are ” . Bowen (1972) 
identifies three requirements for problem - formulation:
(i) an understanding of the decision - making system that will use advice 
based on ordered processing of data;
(ii) an understanding of the decision sets that are relevant; and
(iii) the establishing of agreed assumptions that will limit and partially 
define the multi - dimensional space within which paths from the current state 
to a desired future state can be mapped ” .
Bowen has gradually developed his ideas about problem formulation. How­
ever, it was not until 1984 that a full picture become apparent and this will be 
discussed later in this chapter.
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Eden (1982) used the term  ‘problem  con stru ction ’ to refer to the process 
which enables “ the client or each member of a team to elaborate and think 
about the context - the explanations for their predicament, why the situation 
m atters to them, the beliefs they have about key people ” . Eden argues that 
it is a “ ... process of gradually making explicit personal views of the nature 
of the issue, it is the collection of subjective knowledge and experience of the 
sort tha t means the organisation employs a person to manage rather than a 
microcomputer ” .
Checkland (1981) has developed a ‘soft - systems methodology’ which he 
claims is applicable to ‘ill - structured’ problems. He believes tha t it is 
” ... a methodology for inquiring and learning, rather than optimising’
(my emphasis). For more details about Checkland methodology, see also 
Checkland (1983, 1985). The Checkland methodology and tha t of Eden will 
both be discussed later.
Others [ see Fidd and Woolley (1980) and Woolley and Pidd ( 1981) ] 
have carried out what they call a ‘pilot study’ in problem structuring. They 
first define problem structuring as: “ ... the process of arriving at a sufficient 
understanding of a particular problem so as to proceed to some sort of formal 
modelling ” . They saw the process of problem structuring as very important 
because it involves such fundamental questions as:
- W hat is the real problem?
- How does the OR analyst know tha t he is working on the right problem?
- How does the analyst decide what to do about the problem?
- How does the analyst decide to set limits to the area of investigation in
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a project?
They conclude their research by viewing the process of problem structuring 
" ... as a process of exploration as the analyst strives to comprehend the full 
complexity of the issue and consider carefully how to manage this complexity” 
Hence, they propose the E x p lo ra tio n  A p p ro a ch  for problem structur­
ing which is characterised by four fundamental aspects: Informality, Hierarchy, 
Continuance, and Inclusiveness. Their main conclusion is that, by following 
the Exploration Approach the analyst will le a rn  about the problem by ‘explo­
ration’.
The need for problem formulation is also emphasised by Stainton (1984b) 
who argued that “ Operational research in the text books is different to that 
which is applied in practice. The text book versions deal with the mechanics of 
solution whilst in practice, the first necessity is to define and formulate ” .
2.5.2 P ro b le m  F o rm u la tio n  M eth o d o lo g ies
A comprehensive coverage of problem formulation methodologies is very 
difficult because of the limited documentation of how people actually do OR. It 
is also difficult to provide a thorough comparison between those methodologies 
which are documented. It is largely accepted tha t if the analyst feels tha t by 
using one methodology he, and his clients, can get to a close understanding 
of the ‘problem situation’ under study, tha t methodology is a good one for a 
particular study.
Checkland (1981) differentiated between methodology and method. W hat 
in fact he aimed to get out of his research programme was a “ ... methodology
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which is a set of p rin c ip les  o f m e th o d  which in any particular situation have to 
be reduced to a method uniquely suitable to tha t particular situation ” . Scholz 
(1984) used ‘method’ and ‘methodology’ as in Chekland’s sense; he saw method 
as the actual tool for solving a problem, whereas methodology deals on a met a 
level, with the nature and creation of concepts suitable for the development and 
implementation of the methods. Scholz went on to argue tha t a methodology 
“ ... tells us, why and how and which specific methods should be developed as 
well as why and how and where these methods should be implemented ” .
The commisson on the Future Practice of OR defines ‘methodology’ in 
their report (1986) as “ ( Methodology ) includes, but is more than, the set of 
methods used. Methodology decides the ends and means of O.R. work, as well 
as including the means, tha t is methods ... ” .
In the following sections I shall outline briefly three problem formulation 
methodologies. These have been chosen because of clear documentation, and 
evidence provided from practical exercises tha t they are proved useful in aiding 
analyst and client in formulating an ill - defined problem.
2 .5 .2 .1  E d e n ’s M eth o d o lo g y
Eden and his colleagues have developed and tested successfully a problem 
formulation methodology to deal with ill - structured policy issues. It is well 
documented in Eden, Jones and Sims (1979, 1983). Due to the fact that, in 
most OR projects, there will be an on - going interaction process between the 
OR analyst and the ‘problem - owners’,the analyst’s main purpose is to ‘explore’ 
his client’s perception about the difficulties of his tasks and the problems in his
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organisation.
In order to help the above exploration process, Eden and his colleagues 
have developed a computer program (COPE) which is now implemented on a 
microcomputer and can be transfered to the client’s organisation in order to 
facilitate the process of data collection and analysis. The program facilitates 
explanation of a ‘cognitive m ap’ which represents the client’s perceived causes 
and consequences of the problem. A detailed inquiry, using the program, might 
be necessary to ‘resolve’ certain issues in the ‘problem situation’.
Although Eden’s methodology is now well established, he did not claim 
tha t it is a comprehensive approach to structure problems. In fact he did stress 
the fact that, “ ... any means of discovering and representing a policy - maker’s 
world will inevitably capture some parts of it, distort others, while yet other 
parts will be entirely missed ” .
2 .5 .2 .2  C h ec k la n d ’s M eth o d o lo g y
As stated before, Checkland’s methodology is developed to deal with ill - 
structured problems. It is a ‘soft systems methodology’ for ‘inquiry’ rather than 
‘optimization’. Checkland argued that the ‘hard ’ is a special case of the ‘soft’ 
systems thinking. He stressed that “ ... it is extremely unlikely that the real 
- world problem situation will map neatly into the well - structured situations 
with which the algorithms deal ” .
Checkland’s methodology consists of two types of activities: ‘real - world’ 
and ‘systems - thinking’ activities. Central to the later, is the establishment of 
‘ro o t  d e fin itio n s’ of systems relevant to the inquiry for which then conceptual
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models will be built to enhance the understanding of both analyst and client 
of the problem situation. At this stage, Checkland is willing to accept ‘hard’ 
systems techniques if this helps to explore the problem situation.
Although the Checkland methodology is widely experienced and used in 
real - world problem situations, people do find difficulties in producing appro­
priate conceptual diagrams because there are no obvious rules for this process. 
See Bowen (1984) for more details about possible shortcomings of the Checkland 
Methodology.
2.5 .2 .3  B ow en ’s M ethodology
Bowen’s methodology is a qualitative modelling approach which is devel­
oped for problem formulation. In developing his methodology, Bowen has made 
use of earlier ideas and research in conflict analysis which are reported in Bowen 
and Smith (1976).
Central to the methodology is the notation [ see figure 6.1 ] and the rules 
for its use which help in building conceptual models. Bowen (1981a) provides 
a clear specifications for these rules. He argues that “ ... the elements that 
make up a system or a sub - system will be those and only those which are 
relevant to the inquiry, and similarly for the direct or indirect relations 
between them ” . Bowen goes on to point out tha t “ The environment of a 
system will consist of all relevant elements tha t can affect the system’s state ... 
the environment will be defined as including the system itself ” . Conflict as 
seen by Bowen “ ... implies that there are some differences ( in aim, 
policy, understanding, etc. ) between two systems that interfere with one or the
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other, or both, in their attaining future states preferred by them ” . Purposeful 
action should start from a person ( shown as a circle ) and communication 
should end at a person.
Bowen (1981a) stated the following conditions to be satisfied in a potential 
experimental environment in which the methodology can be applied:
(a) the initial sense of conflict is small;
(b) the language is broadly acceptable ab initio;
(c) the clients will be cooperative for the experimental purpose; and
(d) the clients will adopt a critical attitude to the process and to the no­
tation.
The first experimental test of the methodology in practice is reported in 
Bowen (1983) which is a summary of the larger document Bowen (1984). Bowen 
concluded his experiment by arguing that “ By itself this experiment is not 
enough: it is also, inevitably, incomplete ” . W hat Bowen wanted, was in fact 
further studies which would help to “ ... ‘prove’ the usefulness of the methodol­
ogy ... ” . Nevertheless, the following are the potential advantages in using the 
notation as suggested by Bowen (1984):
1. “ As a basis for a language to describe and develop problems, the 
notation has the advantage of logical simplicity and visual neatness and 
compactness ” ;
2. “ It enables both physical and conceptual systems to be described in 
the same sort of way ... ” ;
3. “ It can compress a lot of data into a small space, it provides a diagram 
to guide thought and communication, and particularly to offer, partially, a
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common language for the latter ” ;
4. “ It does not accept overlapping systems: e ith e r  systems must be broken 
down and given new sub - systems labels o r systems must be drawn as at a 
particular time or stage to identify changing states or shifting roles
Chapter 6 of this thesis will describe one of the ‘further studies ’ rec­
ommended by Bowen. This in fact was the first industrial application of the 
methodology which was proved useful for the notation and the methodology as 
a whole.
2.5.3 T h e  C hoice
The choice of the methodology was conditioned by the eventual practi­
cal task undertaken to support the research aims. An operational researcher 
chooses a particular methodology because he feels tha t he can handle it ef­
ficiently in tha t situation. It is probable tha t those who had developed a 
methodology would almost certainly use their own. For me the choice was 
based on both subjective and objective reasons. It is possible tha t all the three 
methodologies introduced above may have worked successfully for the purpose 
of the problem formulation experiment outlined in chapter 6.
An advantage in using Eden’s methodology is tha t it enables the problem 
owner(s) to understand their problems in terms of their cognitive style. W hat I 
wanted was to examine how managers learn and how they perceive situations, 
and this is an issue which is fully compatible with what the cognitive maps 
can offer. However, using Eden’s methodology needs a deep understanding of 
verbal construction which is very difficult for one who does not speak English as
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a first language. It is also true that, although there are differences, Eden offers 
a learning process which can also be provided by using Bowen’s methodology.
Although Checkland’s methodology has been tested in practical stud­
ies [ see Checkland (1981) ], Bowen (1984) has pointed out certain possible 
shortcomings of the methodology. He argued tha t Checkland “ ... uses, on 
occassion, set theoretic diagrams and influence arrows in a manner similar to 
(Bowen’s), although (Checkland) has not developed his ideas and so they lack 
consistency, discipline and definition ” . Bowen also stated two ‘reservations’ 
on the concept of ‘root definition’. He argued “ ... it is not clear what guides 
and stimulates their formulation, nor whether they have to be acceptable in 
principle to the owners of the systems, or whether they can be simply models 
used by the analyst for his purpose, at least initially ” . In fact both Bowen’s 
and Eden’s methodologies inherently introduce ‘root definition’.
The Checkland methodology is intended for a total OR intervention by 
a consultant invited in for a specific purpose by a firm, whereas I was doing 
something rather different. My intention was to look into certain areas which I 
wanted to research.
Based on the above arguments, and on the fact tha t there are inevitable dif­
ficulties in borrowing others’ methodologies to be applied in a real environment 
where both research findings and client satisfaction are of great importance, I 
did not feel tha t learning to use and adapt these methodologies for my purpose 
would be a satisfactory choice. The time scale tha t was required to understand 
and apply Bowen’s methodology, especially when the author had a direct con­
tact with its developer, was relatively less ( possibly very much less ) than tha t
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necessary to know and apply either Eden’s or Checkland’s methodologies. The 
purposes of the Bowen methodology as defined by Bowen (1984) are consistent 
with the task in hand. It was designed to look mainly at the problem formula­
tion area and to aid the analyst and his client to communicate purposefully in 
order to formulate the client’s problem.
For all the above reasons I decided to choose the Bowen problem formu­
lation methodology and I have applied it in chapter 6. I was aware tha t this 
would be the first time tha t the methodology would be used in direct interaction 
in an industrial environment. However, there was no obvious reason to believe 
tha t it would not work in ways similar to that outlined in Bowen’s experimental 
work. Hence, there was an added opportunity to test the methodology in the 
way that Bowen had originally intended.
- 4 1 -
CHAPTER 3 
IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH MODELS
3.1 In tro d u c tio n  a n d  C onclusion
In this chapter I discuss a wide range of model classifications and uses. 
Models are developed for various purposes, such as research, experimentation 
and as aid to decision - making. Once again what is included here are aspects 
of implementation which are important for guiding the actual implementation 
process met in this research.
Experience shows that many operational research models have ‘failed’ to 
be implemented by their potential users; hence, an ‘implementation problem’ is 
recognised. Despite the importance of this problem, the literature review shows 
tha t very little attention has been paid to research in this area.
It is felt tha t what managers need are models which allow them to refiect 
on the way they manage process and n o t those which simulate tha t process.
3.2 T h e  C o n cep t o f M o d el in O R
In operational research, as well as in many other disciplines, the concept 
of ‘model’ is widely used. Ackoff and Sasieni (1968) defined a model as a 
‘representation of reality’; i.e. an abstraction of things thought to be im portant 
in a real life situation. They stress the need for simplicity in models; “ If they 
were as complex and difficult to control as reality, there would be no advantage
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in their use ” .
The simplicity in models does not mean tha t reality should be distorted in 
order to get a manageable mathematical model. Any predictions through the 
use of a distorted model will, of course, mislead the potential model user. Apart 
from predictions, the model may be used to enhance the client’s understanding 
of his problem by learning through the model.
The model building process is both an ‘a r t’ and a ‘science’. It definitely 
needs a closer user involvement especially when dealing with ‘messy’ problem­
atic situations. See chapter 2 for a definition of messy problems. It is also 
subjected to certain types of errors; Bowen (1978b) has pointed out the follow­
ing three types of error which can be committed by analysts in using the models 
th a t they build:
(1) The irrelevancies and inadequacies of models which have not been devel­
oped for the particular problem in hand may be insufficiently studied, identified 
and corrected, and their consequences overlooked in the analysis.
(2) The capability of the model for determining outcomes which are not of 
interest, or for providing precision which is not required, may be used because 
it is there.
(3) The model may be perceived as equivalent to reality, rather than as 
representing reality in some uncertain way.
Among the various issues that the model builder have to concentrate on 
in building and improving his model, are ‘verification’ and ‘validation’. V er­
ifica tion  is to test the model output against results of another known cases.
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Bowen (1978b) argued tha t “ as models become more elaborate, such veri­
fication becomes very difficult ” . V alidation is to test the agreement between 
the model and the actual system behavior. But as Bowen (1978b) pointed out, 
“ Validation of models is not possible in an absolute sense. Models are, in one 
sense, valid only in so far as they are accepted by the primary decision - maker 
and their solutions found useful by him in coming to a final decision ” . Bowen 
went on to argue that “ ... there is no theory of validation, and no objective 
way of measuring the value of analysis ” .
Because of the wide interpretations of the concept ‘model’, several attem pts 
have been made to classify models. In the next section, various classification 
schemes will be examined.
3.3 C lass ifica tio n  of M odels
In this section, three proposed classification schemes will be discussed. It is 
im portant to note tha t these classifications are not intended to aid the analyst 
in building a model for some stated problem situation. They are also not 
urging the solving of a specific class of problems by a specific class of models. 
The schemes are guides to assist thinking about the possibilities and nature of 
different types of model.
Ackoff and Sasieni (1968) identified three types of models tha t are com­
monly used in OR as well as in most of science: iconic, an a lo g u e , and sym ­
bolic . They define an iconic model as the one in which “ ... the relevant prop­
erties of the real thing are represented by the properties themselves, usually
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with a change of scale Examples of this type of model are ‘model’ airplanes, 
ships, and automobiles. In an analogue model, “ ... one set of properties 
( is used ) to represent another set of properties ” . For example, a hydraulic 
system can be used cls an analogue of electrical, traffic, and economic systems. 
Finally symbolic models use letters, numbers, and other types of symbols to 
represent variables and the relationships between them. “ .... ( They ) take the 
form of mathematical relationships ( usually equations or ‘inequalities’ ) that 
reflect the structure of tha t which they represent ” . The emphasis by Ackoff 
and Sasieni is on the symbolic models because “ ... they usually yield more ac­
curate results under manipulation than do either iconic or analogue models ” . 
But Ackoff and Sasieni also refer to another type of model, namely the concep­
tu al m odel. Such models often are “ ... diagrams that record our conception 
of what variables are relevant and how they are related ” . According to the 
above classification, the OR type models come under symbolic and conceptual 
schemes.
Laing (1981) proposed a classification which is based on a broad under­
standing of the concept ‘model’. Table (l) shows the seven types of the pro­
posed models. Table (2) shows the subclassification of models also proposed by 
Laing (1981). He argues th a t his classification method tends to “ ... prevent 
a narrow approach to problem - solving ” . Nevertheless, he believes 
tha t “ ... classification and model building approaches tend to be a m atter of 
personal choice ” .
Wilson (1985) has examined three classification systems of models in OR 
and found tha t not all case studies from the Journal of the Operational Research
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Table 1. Types of Models 
Type of Model Comment
PP Pure Physical
PG Physical Geometric
IG Interpretive 
geometric
lA Interpretive 
Analogue
CA Computational 
Analogue
CM Computational 
Mathematical
PM Pure Mathematical
Real full scale models
Geometrically scaled 
model retaining the 
general physical 
characteristics of the 
full-scale version.
Model geometrically 
scaled but with different 
physical characteristics 
to the original
Model is unlikely to 
resemble physically the 
original but to give an 
analogous effect
These models are concerned 
with mathematical 
simulation emd use very 
simple mathematics.
Mathematical estimation 
based on observation 
and mathematics which 
are not especially 
complicated
Mathematical models 
using pure mathematics 
and the minimal 
assumptions.
Example
'Reconstruction of the 
crime', using real people 
and objects.
A model building designed 
to study strength of the 
structure
A scaled model human 
dummy, the design of which 
entails the use of 
mathematics.
A shape designed to 
indicate an effect, such 
as ball bearings of 
weights and sizes 
designed to simulate the 
movement of a human body 
under shock waves.
The probability of ships 
waiting for unloading, 
as in a computer 
simulation model.
The determination of the 
coefficients of an 
equation for a market 
share by analysis of 
observations.
The Newtonian laws of 
physics.
Tcible 2. Explanation of Terms
Special category
A Adaptive 
B Behavioural
D Deterministic 
E Economic
S Stochastic
Comment
Adapts to latest data. 
Explains behaviour patterns
Chance does not affect model,
Indicates influence of 
economic factors.
Model makes allowances for 
chance events.
Example
Forecasting.
Interactions of groups 
under stress.
Newtonian laws of motion.
Prediction of effects of 
change.
Probability of critical 
build up in reactors.
Taken from Laing (1981)
Society can be fitted into the classification types. The classifications are based 
on the Ackoff and Sasieni (1968) view that “ ... in solving a problem, what 
is required is an examination of the structure and content of the problem, 
and once th a t has been performed, a model can be built of the system in 
which the problem is embedded. The problem may then be grasped and solved 
once its structure has been established ” . Following are the three proposed
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classifications.
1. Ackoff and Rivett ( AR ) in which seven types of problem are isolated 
in terms of form and content. These are queuing problems, inventory problems, 
allocation problems, scheduling and routeing, replacement and maintenance, 
search problems, and competition.
2. Ackoff and Sasieni ( AS ). This approach classifies problems according 
to the difficulty of formulating the structure.
3. Rivett ( R ). This approach classifies problems according to the presence 
or absence of an element of feedback by which the variables affect the condition 
of the system.
Wilson concludes by arguing that all three classification schemes did not 
give information about “ ... what went on at the sharp end of the analyst - 
client interface ... ” .
3.4 Im p le m e n ta tio n  o f O R  M odels
When an OR inquiry is carried out to explore ‘problematic situations’ in 
operational systems, there might be a need to go beyond the problem formu­
lation stage. In this case, the OR analyst has to develop types of model for 
a number of purposes other than those of analytical ‘solutions’ ( e.g. to en­
hance the client’s understanding of certain aspects of the problem by lea rn in g  
through the model).
Experience shows that many OR models have not been implemented by 
potential users; hence, it was felt that there exists an ‘implementation problem’
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in OR. However, in the early days of OR development, very little attention 
was paid to implementation because of the cissumptions that research efforts 
should be concentrating on developing technically sophisticated techniques and 
tha t these would be easily accepted by problem owners. In more recent years, 
however, research has been directed to investigate the problem and various ideas 
are reported in the literature to enlighten the causes for the ‘failure’ of OR 
models to meet managers’ expectations. As with problem formulation this 
problem is not new. Howeve ways of dealing with it are only slowly emerging.
Ackoff (1962) called for attention to be paid to the implementation of OR 
investigations especially when the object of the OR study is to improve the 
operations of systems. He argued that, “ ... the decision maker may be very 
strongly influenced by the availabilty of a detailed plan for implementation 
in determining whether or not to accept and act on the research findings ” . 
Ackoff’s argument came in the early days of OR where it was mainly concerned 
with ‘tactical’ well - defined problems. As we will see later, the implementation 
problem gets difficult when the OR analyst deals with ‘ill - defined’ problems. 
See chapter 2 for defintion of well - and - ill defined problems.
Little (1970) has argued that “ The big problem with management science 
models is tha t managers particularly never use them ” . Although he added; 
“ There have been a few applications, of course, but the practice is a pallid 
picture of the promise. Much of the difficulty lies in implementation and an 
especially critical aspect of this is the meeting between manager and model ” . 
Little went on to identify the following reasons for the failure of models to meet 
managers’ expectations:
—  48  —
1. good models are hard to find;
2. good parameterization is even harder;
3. managers do not understand the models;
4. most models are incomplete .
Little warned OR analysts not to add further ‘complications’ to their mod­
els when managers do not understand them. W hat a manager needs, as Little 
has found, is a model which is “ ... an extension of his ability to think about
and analyze his operation ” . He called this model a ‘decision  c a lc u lu s’. In
fact, Little’s argument was a call to think about and research the causes of the 
failure of models to get user satisfaction.
White (1975) made the following four points about the implementation of 
OR analysis.
1. The likelihood of implementation will depend on how the project was 
carried out.
2. The ability to persuade people to implement is very important.
3. The resources needed to implement a solution should be considered as 
early on in the study as is feasible.
4. The participation of the researcher in the implementation is advisable 
because only he really understands when the model is valid and when changes 
should take place because of changing conditions.
W hite’s treatm ent of the OR process and the need to pay attention to prob­
lem formulation may help the analyst’s research findings to be implemented.
Closely related to the ideas of Little (1970) and others, Bandyopadhyay 
(1975) stressed the existence of ‘implementation problem’ in OR models. He
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summarized his understanding of the reasons for rejecting models in actual 
practice as follows:
1. “ Certain consequence variables missed in the modelling stages ( includ­
ing testing stages ) may be considered later as significant ... ” .
2. “ The model, though workable in theory, does not clearly prescribe the 
changes needed in practice to implement the model ... ” .
3. “ The model does not reflect the change that has taken place in the 
environment since its validation ... ” .
4. “ A model may be rejected because either the mechanism or the measure 
or both are not adequately understood by the decision - maker ” .
5. “ Further behaviour may be dependent on future random events and 
the model can describe these only probabilistically ” .
The above ideas, and other research work, may have influenced some re­
searchers to find out what type of models the decision makers want out of a 
client - analyst interaction. Simon et al (1976) identified the following types of 
models employed by managers: (l) ‘decision - making’ model, (2) ‘information 
supplying’ model, (3) ‘need to know’ model, (4) ‘rationale’ model, (5) ‘repu­
ta tion ’ model. However, the fact remains that before developing any type of 
model, a thorough identification of the manager’s needs has to be made.
Michel and Permut (1976) have carried out a survey of the articles reported 
in the Operational Research Quarterly over the period 1965 - 1974. They stated 
the following reasons why there has been relatively little impact of the OR 
literature on its practice:
1. The literature does not reflect organisational needs.
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2. Organisations distrust the use of OR models.
3. The assumptions made by operational researchers are not reflective of 
the actual environment.
4. The models described in the literature are too complex and costly to be 
implemented within an organisation.
They conclude that only 30% of the models reported were actually imple­
mented during the above period.
Hildebrandt (1977) has also observed the implementation gap between the 
theory and practice of OR. He considered the implementation problem as a 
fu n d a m e n ta l one since “ Decision making can only be improved through 
OR/MS if the methods and models are used in organisations ” . He went on 
to argue th a t the implementation problem is a co n tin u in g  one because “ ... 
future advances in OR/MS methods must be accompanied by new and useful 
applications ” . Hildebrandt (1980) provides supporting evidence for his earlier 
ideas by arguing tha t “ Our ability to provide managers and user organisations 
with systems they will flnd useful a n d  will adopt has not kept pace with our 
growing technical capacity ” . Although what Hildebrandt says could refer to 
the implementation of OR models in the simple sense, his main concern is 
with those models which govern and guide the behaviour of analyst and client 
through the OR process.
Mintzberg (1979) pointed out the managers’ ‘resistance’ to OR models and 
analysis. He stated the following ‘pitfalls of implementation’.
1. Managers resist analysis because they do not understand it ( or the 
people who d o i t ) .
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2. Managers resist analysis because they haven’t been sold on it.
3. Analytical solutions are resisted because they lack the support or par­
ticipation of top management.
4. Resistance to analysis can be explained by managerial attitude and 
organisational climate.
5. Politics in organisations blocks or distorts the use of analysis.
The above five ‘pitfalls’ are equally important, and analysts have to seek 
ways to make sure that their research findings are not considered redundant by 
top management. Supporting evidence for the above ideas came from Quade 
and Tomlinson (1981) who argued tha t “ ... there are numerous papers pointing 
out where implementation has failed, but many fewer that tell what to do during 
the study before the decision is taken to make failure less likely ” .
Although the ‘implementation problem’ is now well recognised, very few 
research studies have been reported which tackle the issue of resolving it. Of 
some importance is the study carried out by Fripp and Stainton (1981) which is 
documented in detail in Fripp (1982b). A research game was used to study the 
implementation problem of OR models. Their recommendation of the type of 
model(s) the manager needs was that, the analyst may “ ... give the manager 
a relatively crude model of his problem developed in such a way that it is easy 
to understand and use; to let him refine it where he feels necessary, and discard 
it when he understands the problem well enough. As this procedure continues 
the manager is essentially involved in a le a rn in g  p rocess , with the OR model 
being used to provide new information, new ‘experience’ and to answer a range 
of questions ” . ( my emphcisis )
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Later, based on this research work Fripp (1985) stresses the ‘implemen­
tation problem’ and points out the need to research the ‘effectiveness’ of 
models ( i.e. to study the ‘effects’ of their ‘usage’ on managers’ decision making 
process ). Fripp concludes that “ ... models can be effective in improving the
quality of decisions  (They) can have a valuable learning effect for users ....
particularly (in) understanding the problem (they are) facing ... ” .
3.5 D iscussion
To sum up the discussion on implementation and what models managers 
need, I make the following points.
1. The implementation of an OR model will depend on whether it deals 
with a ‘well’ or ‘ill - defined’ problem. In well - defined problems, a conventional 
model can be easily offered and sold. The manager might well be persuaded 
to use it. However, with ill - defined problems the model may not go further 
than to help the manager to learn about the problem rather than solve it [ see 
Quade (1981) ]. It is this learning process with which the research in this thesis 
is concerned.
2. The decision maker may ‘ignore’ the ‘advice’ given to him by an OR 
analyst especially if the advice is of ‘a too definitive nature’ and if the decision 
maker “ ... perceives new constraints, obtains new information and, conse­
quently decides to act on new assumptions. ” [ see Bowen (1975a) ]. This 
implies the time dimension in modelling and implementation of models.
3. The model may ‘solve’ a particular problem encountered by the decision
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maker, but may not be implemented. One likely reason for this may be tha t 
the manager does not understand the model or see it as containing enough of 
his world. It is not advisable in this case to build a new complicated version of 
the original model.
4. A high degree of managers’ participation in model building is very 
im portant for later model implementation, [ see chapter 6 of this thesis ]. Al­
though OR models reported in the literature are considered theoretically sound 
and represent processes logically, they often failed to be implemented. They 
are either technically wrong or something of the managers’ world is missing. It 
is the latter issue which leads to the hypothesis stated in the following point.
5. It seems tha t although managers have to understand the technical pro­
cesses which they are managing, the decisions they take include so much else. 
In handling the organisation that uses these technical processes, they are faced 
by a management task which is very complex. Hence, what managers need are 
models which allow them to reflect on the way they manage process and n o t 
those which simulate that process. This reflection should not only affect the 
way they take decisions but also enhance their learning. These points are taken 
as a basis for the practical study which is discussed in chapters 6 and 7 of this 
thesis.
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CHAPTER 4 
GAMES AND GAMING
4.1 In tro d u c tio n  a n d  C onclusion
This chapter will discuss gaming technique as an Operational Research ac­
tivity which involves real decision makers interacting with a model environment. 
Gaming and game theory are seen as two different, albeit related, activities.
Games are classified, according to their purpose, in different categories, 
viz., teaching, research, learning and fun. Based on Bowen’s definition, the 
concept of a learning game was examined in detail.
The available games were seen as useful in learning about a process, e.g. 
an inventory system, but not in controlling that process ( which is the prime 
job of management ). The literature review shows that learning games in the 
traditional form do not seem to have developed for application at top managerial 
level.
4.2 G am es a n d  G am in g
A game is a model which is developed for some purpose. More specifically, 
it is defined by Klein (1984) as: “ a  m o d e l o f th e  re a l w o rld  in which th e  
p ass in g  o f tim e  is of particular importance, and in which the behaviour of 
one or more h u m a n  p a r tic ip a n t is of primary importance ” .
Because of the nature of the decision process in complex systems, decision
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aids are becoming of increasing importance. Earlier, it was largely thought tha t 
optimization models are the ultimate tools in the sense tha t they help the de­
cision maker in making a choice. However, issues such as, problem formulation 
and identification of the required data or information for decision are activities 
which need other than optimization models. Hence, as Bowen (1978a) argues:
“ A game may be a means of obtaining some idea of the decision problems 
involved in operating within a complicated system. It may be used to give 
confirmation, in the mind of a customer, of the sort of results obtained from less 
overt, and less realistic, computer simulations or mathematical models ” . Bowen 
sees both computer simulations and analytical models as useful techniques in 
decision making research.
Gaming is the activity of using games. More specifically as Shubik (1975a) 
argues:
“ Gaming entails the use of a scenario, game, simulation, or model to pro­
vide a background or environment in which a set of individuals usually referred 
to as players will act. The environment is almost invariably a simulation or 
model of a real environment ” .
Participants in a game are guided by rules which provide them with choices, 
for each of which there will be a likely outcome. Generally, the participant 
is uncertain about the model’s reaction to his choices. More difficult is the 
situation when he is also uncertain about other participants’ choices.
Game theory and gaming are frequently confused. They are in fact 
“ ... two extremely different yet highly related disciplines ” [ Shubik (1972) ].
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In other two very useful references, Shubik [ (1975a), (1975b) ] has provided an 
outline of the use of game theory concepts in gaming. He defines game theory 
as a;
“ ... part of a growing body of theory concerning decision making. In par­
ticular, game theory provides the language for the description of (a) conscious, 
goal - oriented decision - making processes involving more than one individual. 
It has provided the tools for analysis of certain relatively subtle concepts, such 
as the state of information, the meaning of choice, move, strategy, and payoff” . 
Shubik went on to argue tha t “ In general, game theoretic reeisoning and anal­
ysis are of considerable use in constructing, discussing, and analyzing gaming 
cises ” .
A good clcLSsical reference for game theory is Von Neumann and Morgen- 
stern (1972). Current developments in game theory includes Metagame theory 
[ see Howard (1971) ] and Hypergame theory [ see Bennett (1980) ].
Despite Shubik’s remarks above, game theoretic approaches were not found 
relevant to the particular type of games which will be discussed in section (4.4) 
of this chapter.
4.3  C lassification of Gam es
Three classification schemes will be outlined. First, Eilon (1963) has clas­
sified management games according to:
Design characterstics:
a- total enterprise or functional.
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b- interacting or non - interacting,
c- computer or non - computer.
Purpose:
a- Training:
(1) as a part of a general management training programme,
(2) to ‘sell’ new techniques or procedures.
b- Research: in order to study
(3) the behaviour of systems,
(4) decision - making process of individuals,
(5) interaction of individuals in a team.
However, as Bowen (1978a) argued, the above classification can be regarded 
as a ‘specialized classification’. Bowen in fact has classified games according 
to their purpose to: teaching, research, learning and fun. The classification 
was intended to “ .. help to identify and use characterstics on which useful 
descriptions of games can be baaed ” . Bowen went on to argue; “ ... classification 
enables a number of very useful distinctions to be made without the need for 
absolute measurement, or with a minimum of such measurement ” .
A teaching game in Bowen’s sense is “ ... a model of some part of the real 
world, within which a student can be guided to see why his behaviour might be 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ ” . As an example of the above category, Dando and Brown 
(1981) have developed an industrial relations teaching game. The purpose of a 
research game is “ ... to obtain measures which describe the decision - process 
and the relationships between situations, choices and cosequences ” .‘Repli-
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cation and control’ are two main characterstics of a research game. As an 
example of a research game, see Sharp and Dando (1977), Cooper (1979) and 
Moynihan (1987a,1987b). See also Bowen (1986) for further discussion about 
research games. Bowen’s learning category will be discussed later.
Shubik (1972) has stated the following reasons for classifying games:
1. To call attention to the important prevalidation problems of specifica­
tio n , i.e., stating purpose and devising criteria by which to judge the attainment 
of one’s goals;
2. To indicate the possibility that in sp ite  of the diversity there may be a 
common core of knowledge and professional skills of importance to all games; 
and
3. To suggest tha t all specialists stand to benefit from an understanding 
of the diversity of gaming because frequently different types of gaming overlap 
and errors or im portant phenomena that may be completely ignored by one spe­
cialist may be obvious to another who sees the same from a somewhat different 
viewpoint.
Shubik classified games according to their purpose to the following cate­
gories: teaching, experimentation, entertainment, therapy and diagnosis, op­
erations and training. It is important to note that the above classification 
has something in common with Bowen’s broader approach. First, both experi­
mentation and operations will come under Bowen’s research category, second, 
Shubik’s teaching and training categories are related to Bowen’s teaching and 
learning games.
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Klein (1984) has added a third dimension to Bowen’s classification. The 
new dimension is ... the level of constructional abstraction at which the game 
as a whole is understood ” . Klein divided this into two categories:
1. “ Low, in which the meaning and content of the game are taken literally 
and more abstract conclusions are not drawn ” .
2. “ High, in which the meaning and content of the game are abstracted 
in order to draw conclusions ” . For further developments of Klein’s work, see 
Klein (1986).
A category which has some aspects of both learning and research games 
is what is labelled in the literature as ‘operational games’. These, are still 
models of real - world situations which are designed to aid participants to make 
decisions and observe their consequences. Shubik (1972) has stated the following 
purposes of using operational gaming:
1. Cross - checking and extra validation of other methods,
2. Extraorganisational communication,
3. Exploration, testing, and planning,
4. Group opinion formulation and ‘Delphi’,
5. Forecasting,
6. Advocacy.
Recently, Stahl (1983) has edited a very good book about operational gam­
ing. It contains experiences from both West and East. However, the concept 
of operational gaming as defined in the book would leave out many potential 
learning processes stemming from research gaming developments in the United
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Kingdom. The definition insists on interaction between human players in a de­
fined situation within which the decision problem resides: such games are seen 
as too complex and specific to be developed for more general learning purposes.
4.4 Learning Gam es
Bowen (1978a) defines a learning game as a model “ ... in which players 
are not controlled, but play freely to extract something for themselves. Their 
behaviour will be known, to some extent, by themselves, but it will not be the 
purpose of the game to make this behaviour explicit for the information of any 
one else ” . Bowen considers a game such as HOT SEAT developed by Hartley 
et al (1979) as a learning game. Further, Bowen (1982) suggests the following 
two actions tha t could improve the chances of a learning game being correctly 
used.
“ Firstly, the game designers should prepare a clear statement of the nature 
of the game, what it can and cannot do. They should emphasise that its main 
purpose is to provide models of the world in which the players have to act. 
From the game, players should be able to learn something of the nature and 
complexity of their allotted tasks in future real situations ” .
Bowen went on to argue that, “ Secondly, such a statement should be 
available to the players from the outset, and should guide the directing staff in 
all their communication with the players ” .
Based on Bowen’s definition of a learning game, it can be argued that 
any models used in the learning process are games. The important question.
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however, is:
W hat sort of models can be made available to managers which will help 
them to learn and retain control of a process which they do not directly involve 
themselves in, except by managing those who do?
It is stressed throughout the literature on games that because of the ad­
vanced information handling techniques, organisational changes, technological 
progress and other factors, managers need to engage in a continuous learning 
process. W hat is available in the literature, to aid the above learning /  training 
process, is what are largely called ‘management games’ or ‘business games’. The 
amount of material is vast, and only a small part of what has been surveyed 
is mentioned here as having particular relevance to the argument. Examples 
of these games are available in [ Mellor and Tocher (1963), McFarlane et al 
(1970), The Scottish Management Game, Creese and Gentle (1974), Yefimov 
and Komarov (1982) ].
Generally, a management game is a model of a process, such as an inventory 
system, which provides an environment in which participants make decisions. 
Several claims have been made about what participants may learn from these 
games, e.g., motivation, skills, knowledge, self awareness, attitudes, and under­
standing. [ See Fletcher (1971) ] for details. Bowen (1978a) argues that:
“ Management games are learning games and may relate to research games in 
two ways. Firstly, they may have some teaching function; secondly, there must 
be a learning process in the development of research games which might need 
support from a learning game ” .
- 6 2 -
Inevitably, the game will provide the participants with a useful environ­
ment to learn from its experience. However, that learning will be enhanced, as 
Jackson (1958) argues; “ ... by a fast moving time scale, by detailed reports on 
results quickly presented once decisions are made, and also to some extent by 
greater freedom to experiment for the sake of information than is usually avail­
able in the real life ” . Learning from the experience will also depend on: What 
the person is looking for, the detailed ‘shape’ of the experience, the nature of 
the person, opportunities to practice, similarities of that experience to other 
experiences, the intrinsic pleasantness /  unpleasantness of the experience. [ See 
Bredemeier and Greenblat (1981) ].
4.4 .1  L im itations o f the A vailable Games
It is well understood that organisational policy is the primary responsibility 
of top management in the organisation. In shaping this policy managers will 
encounter different problems and need to learn about different issues. Can the 
available models ( games ) help in that learning process?
Shubik (1975b) questioned the level of that learning provided by the game, 
he argued: “ Did ( the participants ) learn the right things? Was the method 
more effective than any other feasible and no more costly alternative? ” . Evans 
and Sculli (1984) went along with Shubik and argued, in their attem pt to eval­
uate business games on a scale related to managerial talent, that “ Results 
suggest that games may not be as useful in developing managerial talent as 
they are in teaching basic business principles and quantitative decision
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making techniques Supportive evidence for these ideas came from Klein 
(1984) who stresses the fact that “ ... a  gam e (m ay) in ad eq u a te ly  re p re ­
sen ts  o r m odels rea lity  ( his emphasis ), and he warned that this is a serious 
weakness in using the game, because participants " ... will probably learn or 
taught the wrong lessons ... ” .
For a quite different, albeit related category of games, Stahl (1983) ad­
dressed the question: “ Why has operational gaming not been used more ex­
tensively? ” . He stated the following three reasons:
1. “ Some top managers regard gaming as a nonserious activity and balk 
at the very ideas of letting gaming influence their decisions ” .
2. “ Top managers think that there is nothing new that they could learn 
from a gaming exercise ” .
3. “ Top managers regard games as too simple and hence too unrealistic 
to depict complex reality well ” .
As a final comment and supporting evidence to these ideas, I would like to 
quote Field (1985) who has stated the following reasons for abandoning games:
1. “ Management games did not accomodate the process of decision too 
well ” .
2. “ Many games are cumbersome to handle ” .
3. “ Management games are incomplete in their structure ” .
4. “ One had to be careful in choosing a game to ensure that it would teach 
the required lessons ” .
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So, despite the claimed advantages in using classical learning games, the 
warning is clear, and it includes the fact that management and control of the 
process is quite different from understanding the process.
4.5 The Way Forward
The original research programme was in fact started solely to set clear cri­
teria for ‘good’ learning games. However, according to the argument developed 
above, and based on what managers really need [ see chapter 3 ] some change 
of emphasis was required.
A statement was drafted to define what needed to be examined in the next 
stage. The ideas generated needed to be looked at in a real environment. The 
statem ent was therefore a research proposal in very general terms and a request 
for help so that the necessary inquiries and experiments could be adequately 
carried out.
4.5 .1  The Statem ent
The statement that follows was sent to local industrial organisations.
Operational Research (OR) has gained a high reputation in dealing with 
industrial problems and in providing an aid to management decision making. 
Games, which are part of a comprehensive body of OR techniques, have been 
established and played for different purposes; one of them is for ‘learning’ where 
participants in a learning game ( such as business games ) can extract something 
for themselves.
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Several claims have been made about the effectiveness of learning games 
such as the following:
- They enable decision makers to practice their skills and to observe con­
sequences of their decisions without having to effect the real world.
- Participants may learn from the game what they might learn from expe­
rience in the real world in which there are several constraints.
- They capture interest.
- They have the ability to focus attention.
f
- Participants can learn different skills such as communication, strategy 
selection, and resource allocation.
Despite the above claims, it is not yet clear what is in learning games 
which validate these. It seems that we must look at the concept of a game 
more broadly, as some sort of interactive modelling. Hence we are addressing 
the problem of the ‘use of models as learning “games” in which we hope to 
investigate several issues such as:
- W hat are the criteria for a ‘good’ learning “game”?
- W hat is the proper role of models in the learning process?
- W hat parts or part of the decision process can be exercised by a learning 
“game”?
- Can a learning “game” provide an environment in which the participant 
can be trained to become a good decision maker in his own business, or in some 
other business?
- Can we generalise the results obtained from running a learning “game
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devised for a particular organisation to another one?
We are looking for a cooperative management who are willing to ‘gain’ from 
such a study in return for providing us with a framework for our enquiries.
4.5 .2  The R esponse
The main purpose of the contacts was to find an environment in which 
managers are challenged with ‘unstructured problems’. Clearly, they will need 
a structured process which may result in developing model(s), to enable them to 
refiect on their expertise to understand these problems. The models might then 
be implemented not only for learning, but also as decision aids for managers, 
or as a training aid for others in the organisation.
The only positive response came from British Airways (BA) Heathrow. Ini­
tial discussions with the Operational Research and Business Support Manager 
resulted in the following understanding;
1. In BA, they have experience with traditional business games.
2. The Operations Department Training Group have introduced comput­
erised allocation models to train BA’s staff on resource allocation problems.
3. They are interested in aspects of Information Technology related to their 
business.
4. The OR manager mentioned specifically that he is looking for a “ Process 
which will result in model(s) such that a manager can see ( through, say a com­
puter terminal ) the whole decision making process in parts of his organisation
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Two departments of BA [ Motor Transport /  Ground Support Equipment 
(M T/GSE) I and [ Information Management (IM) ] were named to need a 
process in the sense of the fourth point above. The main reason for the need was 
the perception of ‘conflict’ between the two departments on the implementation 
of computer models developed by IM for MT/GSE.
In this discussion, and the discussions which followed with the named de­
partm ents, it became apparent that a specific type of model, namely a Decision 
Support System (DSS),was in their mind as a possible consequence of my inter­
vention. Although I accepted that this could be so, the primary purpose would 
be to look at the learning process and learning models that could assist the 
managers concerned to appreciate their tasks more fully. Whether these would 
also constitute a DSS or only the basis for DSS could not be stated at this stage. 
It was stressed tha t by enhancing their learning would enable problems to be 
perceived more reasonably. But, there was still a need for some process to help 
them to formulate their problems.
Because of the OR manager’s perception of the problems of the depart­
ments he mentioned and their links with DSS , it was necessary to examine 
the area of DSS both before and during the interaction with the departments. 
The next chapter deals with some of the principles of DSS which turned out 
to be relevant in the research that follows. The main research is described in 
chapters 6 and 7.
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CHAPTER 5 
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
5.1 In tro d u c tio n  a n d  C onclusion
This chapter will discuss Decision Support Systems (DSS) as interactive 
computer - based systems aimed at supporting rather than replacing the man­
agement decision - making process. More literature exists than can possibly 
be read, assimilated and reviewed in the time available. What is quoted is a 
selective collection of ideas of recent date, chosen because they seem to be expe- 
rientially - based, generic rather than specific in nature, and related directly or 
indirectly to the le a rn in g  process of managers ( both in the development and 
use of decision support ). The fact that DSS are interactive processes implies a 
game of some sort in the general sense dealt with in chapter 4.
DSS are developed to deal with ill - structured problems and to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of organisations. They are seen as complementary to 
but different from other Information Systems such as Electronic Data Processing 
Systems (ED?) and Management Information Systems (MIS).
Various definitions of DSS are discussed which are based on both practical 
and academic experiences, and a ‘definitional problem’ is recognised. Interac­
tiveness and flexibility are seen as the two key issues in the development of a 
DSS.
The DSS as a ‘model’, was found to face the common problem in all models.
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the ‘implementation problem’. Various reasons for this are outlined and an 
‘Evolutionary Strategy’ is seen as the ‘best’ one to increase the likelihood of 
successful implementation.
5.2 In fo rm a tio n  P ro cessin g
A widely accepted view is that information processing is not always an end 
in itself. Rather it is a means to decisions. [ Bonczek et al (1981) ]. Bonczek et 
al view decisions as the ‘finished products’ of a human - machine information 
processing system in which information is only a ‘raw material’.
In fact, all computer systems are implemented in organisations to help 
people to store, retrieve, update,...etc. data and information. Note that, despite 
the label, it is data processing that is generally being carried out, although it 
is hoped ( or even planned ) that the data become information for decision.
There are three widely confused terms concerning the use of computers in 
organisations. Based on a ‘connotational view’, the roles of Electronic Data Pro­
cessing Systems (EDP), Management Information Systems (MIS), and Decision 
Support Systems (DSS), are distinguished by Sprague and Carlson (1982). 
E D P  has the following characterstics:
“ a focus on data, storage, processing, and fiows at the operational level” ; 
“ efficient transaction processing ” ;
“ scheduled and optimised computer runs ” ;
“ integrated files for related jobs ” ;and 
“ summary reports for management” .
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M IS  has the following characterstics:
“ an information focus, aimed at middle managers 
“ structured information flows ” ;
“ integration of E D P  jobs by business function (production M IS , market­
ing M IS , personal M IS , etc.)” ; and
“ inquiry and report generation (usually with a data base )” .
D SS  has the following characterstics:
“ decision focused, aimed at top managers and executive decision 
makers ” ;
“ aimed at flexibility, adaptability, and quick response ” ;
“ user initiated and controlled ” ;
“ support for the personal decision - making styles of individual man­
agers ” .
Recent advances in computer technology have resulted in a ‘problem’ of 
how to integrate information processing systems in organisations so that their 
outputs are ‘good’ decisions. Kami (1978), quoted in Bonczek et al (1981), has 
pointed out two possible directions to treat the above problem:
1. advances in computer technology ( e.g. memory size and processing 
speeds ); and
2. the methodologies of information - processing systems, which include
a. methodology for implementing mechanical information processing; and
b. methodology for integrating the mechanical information processing with 
the human elements in a human machine system.
The view is that technological advances are ‘revolutionary’whereas method­
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ological advances are ‘evolutionary’. The following section will provide a thor­
ough discussion of DSS.
5.3 D ecision  Support System s (D SS)
5.3.1 General Background for D SS
Decision Support Systems (DSS) first emerged in the 1970’s [ Alter (1980), 
Bonczek et al (1981) ] e l s  a new, practical approach for applying computers and 
information to the decision problems faced by management. DSS is one of the 
most interdisciplinary fields within information systems research. [ See Jarke 
(1986) ].
As a discipline, DSS is largely engaged in research to:
1. identify design criteria for tools that can help improve the effectiveness 
of decision - makers;
2. develop techniques and approaches for evolving a DSS as the user, with 
the designer, learns through system development and system use;
3. observe the use and impact of a DSS in order to define better strategies 
for decision support; and
4. assess the opportunities and constraints for Decision Support in available 
and emerging management and information processing technologies. [ Alter 
(1980) ].
Alter states the following important questions that need special attention 
in the Decision Support discipline.
l .T h e  system : W hat does the system do?
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W hat is its technical configuration?
2.The problem : What problems does the DSS address?
How does it help the user?
3.The user: Who uses the system and in what manner?
4.The im plem entation: How was the system conceived,developed, and 
installed? W hat problems arose in the implementation, and were these problems 
addressed?
5.The im pact: What impact has the system had?
How was the impact measured?
6.The evaluation: Why is or is not the system a success?
Keen (1981) argues that “ ... most DSS evolve. There is no final system; 
an initial version is built and new facilities are added in response to the user’s 
experience and learning ” . Keen went on to stress that “ The decision to build 
a DSS seems to be based on value, rather than cost. The system represents an 
investment for future effectiveness ” .
At the early stages of research and applications in DSS, there were diffi­
culties in both hardware and software. Recently, however, advances in micro - 
computers, colour graphics and telecommunication networks have become in­
creasingly effective and available, as Keen (1986) has pointed out that 
“.. technology is not the bottleneck anymore ” for DSS. What is now needed, 
as Keen argues, is to "... provide more active modes of support ... by focussing 
on supporting decisions that really m atter in organisation ” . ( my emphasis - 
this implies some concentration on adequate problem - formulation ).
The next section will examine various definitions of DSS which are based
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on both practical and academic experiences.
5.3.2 C h a ra c te rs tic s  of D SS
Since the start of the movement of DSS, there exist various definitions of 
this new activity. An examination of these definitions will reveal that they agree 
tha t the system must be designed to aid raher than replace the functions of the 
decision - maker.
Some researchers in the field see DSS as an interactive system designed to 
be used by managers. Others concentrate on the support issue rather than on 
the technical characterstics of the system. Phillips (1984) usefully summarised 
by Bowen (1985), argues that a DSS is “ ... any system that helps the manager 
to fo rm  preferences, make judgements and take decisions ” . There are 
“... three main components to decision technology: people, mainly the problem 
owners who provide essential expertise; in fo rm a tio n  technology that stores 
data, processes it into information and provides analysis; and p reference  tech­
no logy  tha t helps to clarify value judgements ” . Further, it is stated that 
“ At the top managerial level, a decision - support system must include;
-those ( including the top manager ) who have information and preferences 
relevant to the problem, for which they have some responsibility;
-computer systems that aid modelling and analysis, and
-‘facilitators’ who provide the framework in which preference judgements 
are encouraged and expressed, where possible in quantitative form, against a 
structure which represents the agreed, formulated problem ” .
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Dickson (1980) reflected on the difficulties that arose when an international 
group attem pted to define a DSS as part of their discussion on various issues 
in the DSS area. He pointed out that a major breakthrough occured when 
it was recognised that “ ... a process exists that leads to the production of 
a specific Decision Support System. Much confusion is caused when the title 
DSS is applied both to the process and to the resulting product ” . It was 
then agreed tha t the process of Decision Support Engineering (DSE) has as its 
primary product a Decision Support System (DSS). DSE draws upon a number 
of disciplines such as Operational Research and Computer Science and others. 
Its product, the DSS, is a tool offering a dynamic, adaptive, and interactive 
process involving the decision maker.
In general we should expect a DSS to have one or more of the follow­
ing characterstics [see Sprague and Watson (1975, 1976), Alter (1980), Keen 
(1980), Keen (1981), Sprague and Carlson (1982), Alavi and Henderson (1981), 
Keen (1986), Sprague (1986), Zmud (1986), Pick and Sprague (1980) j.
1. The DSS is designed specifically to support decision making. It often 
addresses “what - if?” questions in a non - routine process which involves 
frequent and ad hoc analysis and fast access to data and models. The level 
of ‘support’ to managers is seen as an important issue in both research and 
practice, e.g.. Keen distinguished the following levels of support 
-passive support,
-traditional DSS support,
-normative support, or
-external decision support.[ Keen (1986) ]
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2. The DSS must possess an interactive query facility with a query language 
tha t is easy to learn. The language enables the user to state the problem that 
he wants the system to advise him on.
3. The DSS is to be flexible and adaptable so that it meets the needs 
of many types of managers who work in different areas in the organisation. 
Flexibility is important because the environment, the tasks and user of DSS are 
subject to frequent changes: It may be
-flexibility to solve,
-flexibility to modify,
-flexibility to adapt,
-flexibility to evolve. [ Sprague and Carlson (1982) ]
Although ‘flexibility’ and ‘adaptivity’ are used interchangeably, some writ­
ers [ see for example Methlie (1980) ] points out that the DSS should be adaptive 
in the sense tha t it fits the user’s requirement and that it should also ‘s tim u la te  
( users’ ) le a rn in g ’ .( his emphasis )
4. The DSS should utilise modern information processing and management 
science techniques.
5. A DSS may deal with a variety of problem areas or perhaps only one.
6. An important issue which differentiates DSS from other related infor­
mation systems is the explicit linkage between DSS and some specific decision 
process.
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5.3.3 T he  D efin itiona l P ro b lem  o f D SS
More recently, two researchers have argued the case of the absence of an 
established definition of a DSS. First, Stabell (1986) argued that "... trying to
define what is unique about DSS technology is not a very useful exercise ......
The key characterstics of DSS are linked to the co n tex t where such systems 
are to be used, to why and how the systems are developed and how the systems 
are intended to be used ... ” .
Secondly, Keen (1986) has proposed the following directions to ‘solve’ the 
the definitional problem:
1. to recognise  th e  difference betw een  defin itions fo r u n d e rs ta n d ­
ing  a n d  defin itions fo r action ;
2. to accep t th a t  th e re  can  be no  defin ition  of decision s u p p o rt 
sy stem , only  o f decision s u p p o r t because the technology that DSS draws 
on constantly changes, and there is no independent or idiosyncratic technical 
base for it;
3. to  e s tab lish  a  version  fo r D SS resea rch  which builds on what has 
been learnt about developing systems but that empheisizes w h a t to develop 
and why.
There is as yet no agreed ‘theory’ of DSS, and some writers [ see Sprague 
and Carlson (1982) ] have preferred to talk about a ‘framework’ for DSS. In 
the light of their proposed framework, three levels of technology were identi- 
fied,Specific D SS , D SS g e n e ra to r  and D SS too ls.
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5.3.4 Im p lem e n ta tio n  o f D SS
As with many decision aids (e.g., models, systems, ... ), DSS will encounter 
implementation problems, [ see Methlie (1980), Alter (1980), Alavi and Hen­
derson (1981) ], and for a general discussion on implementation, see chapter 3 
of this thesis.
Here 1 refer to two statements about the implementation of DSS. First, 
Alter (1980) called for an ‘implementation risk analysis’ which will identify an 
‘ideal implementation situation’ and observe any deviations between the existing 
circumstances and the ideal situation. These deviations are called ‘risk factors’ 
and they decrease the chance for successful implementation. Alter identifies the 
following risk factors.
1. Nonexistent or unwilling users
2. Multiple users or implementers
3. Disappearing users, implementers, or maintainers
4. The ability to specify purpose or usage pattern in advance
5. The ability to predict and cushion impact on all parties
6. Lack or loss of support
7. Lack of prior experience with similar systems
8. Technical problems and cost - effectiveness issues
The second study was carried out by Alavi and Henderson (1981) to inves­
tigate alternative strategies for implementing DSS. They identified two strate- 
gies’.E v o lu tio n ary  and T rad itio n a l. The evolutionary approach is the one 
which “ ... utilises judgement modelling as a means to create a felt need, to
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provide insight into the decision process and the implied weighting of decision 
variables, and to establish a learning based, participatory implementation stra t­
egy The traditional approach, in contrast, is characterised by “ ... a problem 
solving orientation wherein the DSS is portrayed as providing a valuable ‘prod­
uct’ tha t can be theoretically justified ” .
Alavi and Henderson’s study suggests that the Evolutionary Strategy is a 
more effective one than the Traditional Strategy. They also offer two guidelines 
for DSS designers.
1. The DSS designer shou ld  consider the nature of the learning activity 
which is being supported by the DSS.
2. The DSS designer m u st consider the sequence in which the learning 
process is carried out.
In addition to the above two studies, and for a quite different albeit related 
category of systems, namely Expert Systems (ES), Bell (1985) has stated the 
following reasons behind the failure of ES especially at the first stage of their 
development.
“ The expert is not available ”
“ The expert is unable to communicate his ideas ”
‘‘ The expert is unwilling to communicate his ideas ”
‘‘ There is no expert ” .
The above reasons apply equally if we think of a DSS client rather than an 
ES. I have encountered the first three in the course of my research but not the 
fourth.
It can be argued that for a successful implementation of a DSS, both the
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consultant analyst and the user(s) should fully cooperate in both the building 
and the maintaining of the DSS system. This issue was one of the central ones 
which affected the process of developing the DSS outlined in chapter 7.
5.3.5 D iscussion
1. Although ‘interactiveness’ was seen as a very important feature of a 
Decision Support System, some writers [ see Alter (1980) ] prefered the use of 
the term  ‘responsiveness’.
Responsiveness is seen as a combination of:
a. P ow er - the degree to which the system ( including its human 
elements ) can answer the most important questions.
b. A ccessib ility  - the degree in which the system can provide answers in 
a timely and consistent manner.
c. F lex ib ility  - the degree to which the system can adapt to changing 
needs and situations.
2. DSS can be developed for individual or group users. Issues such as 
communication and control in organisation will become of great importance 
within any group DSS. Support should, ideally, be provided at all levels in the 
organisation in order to assist integration between the levels. DSS should also 
support all phases of the decision making process.
3. The experiment and the analysis reported in chapters 6 and 7 are con­
sistent with and support the ideas outlined in these chapters. It was found that 
in real organisations, managers are engaged in creating ‘decision situations’ and
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are dealing with ill - s tru c tu re d  problems. Hence, providing them with ‘flexi­
ble’ and ‘adaptable’ DSS is an important task which needs a thorough analysis 
prior to the development phase. The analysis should aim at understanding the 
management task environment in order to develop a ‘better’ model of support.
4. The definitional problem in DSS may be caused because the words DSS 
have certain ‘intutive validity’ in that any system that support a decision is a 
DSS. Another cause of the problem is that people from different backgrounds 
view DSS quite differently.
5. Based on the ideas outlined in this chapter, it can be argued that a 
DSS is not a ‘technical solution’ to a ‘technical problem’. It is not primarily 
developed to collect and manipulate data and information although it might 
sometimes do some of this. Rather, it is a device which aims to support the 
decision process and its success will depend on the principles of its development 
and the manner of its use.
A good DSS provides a learning process and its flexibility should enable this 
learning to be made effective by modifying the DSS. The analyst as a facilitator 
may be required to help with the process that leads to definition of the changes 
required.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE BA EXPERIMENT
6.1 Introduction  and Sum m ary
This chapter describes the first stage of development of the interaction in 
the real environment briefly introduced in section 4.5.2. The total interaction 
took place between February 1985 and July 1986, including the studies reported 
in chapter 7. The chapter reports the first use of the Bowen problem formulation 
methodology [ see Bowen (1984) ] in an industrial environment with managers 
facing ‘unstructured problems’.
A key feature of the methodology is the development of conceptual models 
by using a notation specifically devised for this purpose. In this chapter con­
ceptual models are developed as part of the inquiry and proved very efficient 
as a means for communication between the analyst and the client group. They 
enable the analyst to structure and reduce data into information to facilitate 
the feedback process to the ‘problem owners’. This contributed to changing the 
‘nature’ of what the clients originally thought to be the problem: further the 
analyst who is a student was treated as a ‘consultant’. The successful interac­
tion has also resulted in deciding on one of the many problems identified to be 
explored in detail [ chapter 7 1.
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6.2 T h e  E n v iro n m en t
This is centred around two departments of British Airways (BA) Heathrow 
as shown in diagram 1.
6 .2 .1  M T /G S E  D e p a rtm e n t
This department is responsible for all scheduled maintenance and emer­
gency repairs of about 3000 vehicles and ground support equipment of Ground 
Operations London (GOL). M T/ GSE employes a large number of qualified peo­
ple in different aspects of technical and organisational functions. Workshops are 
distributed, in general, close to the users’ areas, and controlled by Senior Main­
tenance Engineers (S.M.E.) in order to provide efficient service. Each workshop 
has the responsibility to manage its resources in order to meet a particular 
schedule planned by the Maintenance Control department. They draw spares 
from central and forward stores.
M T/GSE is a user of two computer systems, S T O C K  and SERV E, which 
were developed by the Information Department (IM).
6.2.2 In fo rm a tio n  M an ag em en t D e p a rtm e n t (IM )
This department is responsible for the structure and type of software and 
hardware of all computerised information systems developed for M T/GSE and 
other departments in BA. These systems are supposed to be reliable and to meet 
user’s requirements. IM’s computer support group is responsible for providing 
users with efficient training in the operation of computer systems. Their ideal
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is tha t every user will be able to contact a named representative in case any 
problems arise.
6.3 C om puter System s Im plem ented by M T /G S E
6.3 .1  SERVE
This system is designed by IM for M T/GSE to enable their operators to: 
a- report vehicles unserviceable (U/S);
b- monitor the progress of the vehicle through the workshops until released; 
c- check the availability and serviceability of vehicles; 
d- plan normal service checks;
e- show the number of vehicles of a particular category required within a 
particular control section for each day of the month;
f- show the seasonal peak number of vehicles required for each type of 
vehicle, for each user;
g- inspect the current number of vehicles and equipment held and utomat- 
ically update records. See SERVE (1985).
It is mentioned later that M T/GSE had no difficulty in operating this 
system, and this may well be because they participated in its development.
6.3 .2  STO CK
This system was initially developed for BA’s Aircraft Engineering depart­
ment to carry out all the required accounting and control operations for about
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600000 engineering stock items. BA’s policy required that all stocks of items 
brought, stored and used within the airline should be controlled by a common 
computerised stock control system S T O C K . See Johnson (1981). Despite the 
fact tha t both the stock and type of service provided by M T/GSE to the rest 
of BA are different from that of A/C Engineering department, M T/GSE was 
asked in April 1983 to implement the original STOCK system, without certain 
improvements available to A/C department. In M T/GSE, STOCK is imple­
mented in the stores department to control about 60000 spare parts. The other 
user is the supplies department which is responsible for ordering the spare parts 
from some 400 suppliers. It is easy to imagine that, no m atter how sophisticted 
is the STOCK system, any errors in the input of data concerning spare parts, 
will create serious problems to the supplies department.
6.4  B ack g ro u n d  to  th e  P ro b lem
In the middle of 1984, a new M T/GSE General Manager was appointed. 
He introduced a considerable reorganisation of the department and started to 
examine various problem areas. He was told by his staff that M T/GSE were 
given the STOCK system which is designed for another user within BA, and 
there was a lack of back - up support provided by IM, which caused problems 
in the availability of spare parts to support the maintenance process. He also 
understood that IM were not prepared to tailor STOCK to M T/G SE’s needs.
The General Manager had no option but to set up in August, 1984 a 
Special Stores Working Group (SSWG) to investigate the M T/GSE stores and
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the STOCK system. The SSWG were given six months to identify better: 
a- computer systems; 
b- supplies interface; 
c- stores organisation and methods.
The SSWG consisted of four Airline Engineers and was headed by the 
Manager of stores and special projects. After six months of study and analysis 
both inside and outside M T/GSE, the SSWG published a report in February, 
1985. Their main recommendations were:
a- M T/GSE could implement a stand - alone stock control system. The 
cost as estimated by an IBM consultant would be about £25000 ( for both 
software and hardware);
b- IM and M T/ GSE have to cooperate to tailor the current STOCK system 
to meet M T/GSE needs.
Some action had already been taken by IM in a report published in October 
1984. Their recommendations were:
a- IM should commit resources to tailor STOCK to meet M T/GSE needs; 
b- M T/GSE should take actions to improve data quality into STOCK.
The above two studies were completed prior to my intervention which was 
facilitated by the Operational Research and Business Support Manager in BA 
[see diagram 1 ] who helped in the first formal discussion with IM manage­
ment. IM then arranged my introduction to the M T/GSE management. Both 
managements agreed to the broad research programme [ see section 4.5.1 ] and
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as a first step relevant documents about STOCK and SERVE systems were 
obtained.
6.5 The A nalyst Intervention
The initial discussions and the documents acquired, especially the SSWG 
report, indicated that there were contradictory views about the reasons behind 
the ‘failure’ of M T/G SE’s version of the STOCK system to meet their needs. 
At this stage, one may define the client’s ‘problem’ as ‘the need to develop a new 
computer - based stock control system’. To examine learning processes in such a 
context might have been an impossible task for the experiment required. It had 
taken a group in IM department nearly five years to develop and implement the 
current system in BA; however, the definition of the problem as a stock control 
deficiency was not yet justified. There was a need to talk to ‘various’ managers 
who had a role in developing the current system and who are using it. I therefore 
started a very important stage of inquiry to seek possible explanations for the 
following:
1- Who uses the computer systems to get what results? ( this was to 
understand the nature of delays and how they are treated in the STOCK 
system ).
2- How does information for management come to managers (a) from the 
computer models; (b) from others as a consequence of information from the 
computer models ?
3- Do managers expect advance warning that some one is not satisfied by 
M T/GSE or IM services?
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4- W hat control do management exercise over the operations they are re­
sponsible for, and how?
5- How did M T/GSE management become aware of the need for the SSWG 
study?
6- How do management plan to stop things going wrong? or put them 
right quickly?
7- W hat data is required by whom to identify; (a) any recurrence of the 
identified shortcomings; (b) some overall picture of interactions that might lead, 
unless improved, to as yet unidentified shortcomings.
Because there were various proposed changes ( still to be properly discussed 
between IM and M T/GSE ) in the current STOCK system as a result of the 
internal study, I also decided to find out:
1- Whose responsibility is it to make these changes?
2- What authority ( if other than their own ) do they need?
3- Are there any things needed as a consequence of answers to the above?
This framework for the inquiry served later to identify other ‘problems’ fur­
ther to what was initially thought to be a problem. It also prevented narrowing 
the scope of the inquiry to a specific direction at an early stage.
6.5 .1  The F irst Round
Because of the wide range of experiences and contradictory views as to why 
the STOCK system was not functioning properly, the need arose for a process 
which would help in structuring and reducing data into information for both
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communication and further exploration of the managers’ needs for decision aids. 
In other words, I realised that my clients were facing ‘unstructured problems’ 
[see chapter 2 ] for which a structured methodology should be applied.
At this stage of the inquiry, ‘various’ people had stated their views quite 
openly and clearly and the interviews were tape - recorded, but, for confidential­
ity reasons, the data acquired cannot be reported here in detail. The following 
members of M T/ GSE department have participated in this stage.
The stores and special projects manager [ see diagrams 3 and 3 first 
revise ];
The senior stores supervisor [ see diagrams 4 and 4 first revise ];
The stores staff union representative [ see diagram 5 ];
The maintenance control manager [ see diagram 6 );
The M T/GSE systems developments engineer [ see diagrams 7 and 7 first 
revise ];
Two senior maintenance engineers [ see diagrams 8, 9 and 9 first revise j;
The vehicles and equipment manager [ see diagrams 10 and 10 first 
revise ];
The operations manager [ see diagrams 11 and 11 first revise ];
Others outside M T/GSE also participated:
The accountant in the finance department, responsible for M T/GSE affairs 
[ see diagrams 12 and 12 first revise ];
The supplies department manager and his spares /  maintenance support 
buyer [ see diagram 13 );
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The IM manager and his senior analyst programmer [ see diagram 14 ].
The initial process of building the diagrams was difficult as it was necessary 
to reduce data into information coded in each diagram for feedback to their 
‘owners’ and to the members of the management group as a whole. What they 
regard as information could not be fully clear at this stage. I had to introduce 
two additions to the notation; namely, the delay and lack of communication 
and purposeful action. The intention was not to extend the notation beyond 
general and simple terms. See Bowen (1984).
Although those who were involved provided me with a rich picture about 
possible problem areas, they wanted to know the direction of my research and 
the possible ‘solutions’ to their problems. At the same time I wanted to present 
my analysis of the data I had. The M T/GSE management group agreed to 
a meeting, and it was attended by: Professor K. Bowen, the Deputy General 
Manager, the Stores Manager, the Vehicles and Equipment Manager and the 
Maintenance Control Manager.
A brief introduction to the Bowen problem - formulation methodology and 
its diagrammatic notation [ see figure 6.1 ] and the problem of problem formu­
lation [ see diagram 2 ] were the first two issues which were used to draw the 
management’s attention to the difficulty in defining their current problems. The 
discussion, which was aided by diagrams 3 through 13 was very encouraging. 
With reference to the STOCK system I pointed out to them that there will be 
actions by people on their computers which may be quite good and definite, 
and there are many others which are distorted. The output from the computer
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will be in some cases understood, and in other cases not understood. In the 
latter, it is not necessarily that the computer system is bad, but operators may 
not act correctly or purposefully, which might be a result of bad training.
The management group soon realised that my inquiry was totally different 
from a traditional OR investigation which might well have concentrated, say, 
on providing another version of the STOCK system. Despite the apparent 
simplicity of the diagrams and the fact that they only contain issues said to me 
earlier by individuals, they seemed to be aware of some of these for the first 
time. Throughout the presentation, members of the group asked very serious 
questions about the analysis and the methodology. More important is that 
they were engaged in discussions about possible ‘problems’ which were not yet 
identified by the analyst. The status of communication between the MT OPS 
manager and the M T/GSE general manager [ see diagram 11 ] was seen as 
a very im portant m atter which needed special attention. They also indicated 
tha t they did not face any problems with the SERVE system for which they had 
participated in the early stages of design, an issue which is explored in detail 
in chapter 2 of this thesis: management participation in building any models is 
one of the key factors for successful implementation. It was also indicated that 
the communication between IM and M T/ GSE had improved considerably over 
the period of my interaction with them: the present discussion was not the first 
influence.
Because of their considerable interest in the first analysis the management 
group agreed that I should continue the inquiry. They asked specifically if I 
could possibly find out how their customers, for example the terminals, felt
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about M T/ GSE service. Their initial perception of the problem had changed 
considerably.
A similar presentation was arranged for the IM department with the pres­
ence of the Senior Operational Research and Business Support Manager [ who 
had arranged my introduction to the organisation, see diagram 1 ]. Perhaps 
the most im portant result of this presentation was this Manager’s interest in 
the findings. He said that he had learnt a lot about the organisation and the 
problems of the two departments and expressed his support for my research. 
He also discussed the possibility for extending this work to examine potential 
problem areas in other departments in BA. The possibility of developing a com­
puter graphics software to process the notation used with the Bowen problem 
formulation methodology was also discussed provisionally.
6.5.2 The Second Round
This was intended to extend the diagrams through further sessions in order 
to get insight into:
- the critical channels of information;
- breaks in the links of communication;
- can managers identify their information needs?;
- the nature of delays M T/GSE is creating to other departments;
There were also two very important additional interviews with
- two Senior Managers in one of the customer Groups [ see diagram 15 ];
and
- the M T/GSE Maintenance Manager [ see diagram 16 ]
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The M T/GSE General Manager was invited to a formal presentation, which 
was attended by Professor K. Bowen, the stores and special projects manager, 
the vehicles and equipment manager, the supplies manager, a principal ana­
lyst programmer in IM and the M T/GSE accountant ( a link with the finance 
department ].
Those attending were taken through chosen diagrams. They reacted very 
seriously to the information contained in each diagram and they were engaged 
in im portant discussions about possible problem areeis which were not clear to 
the General Manager or his group before.
Following are quotations from reactions to the diagrams presented in the 
this presentation.
D ia g ra m  3 F ir s t  R evise; The stores and special projects manager indicated 
that M T/G SE did not had a hand in developing STOCK and they did not 
understand its main functions when it was first implemented. The stores and 
special projects two roles were not clearly identified.
D ia g ra m  4 F ir s t  R evise: The M T/GSE General Manager agreed to the 
need for a training group within M T/GSE to train the staff in the use of the 
computer systems.
D ia g ra m  11 F ir s t  R evise: The main issue which dominated the discussion 
was the status of communication between the M T/GSE General Manager and 
the MT OPS Manager. It became clear later [ see diagram 17 ] that there is a 
distorted communication between the two managers.
D ia g ra m  14: The M T/GSE General Manager claimed that he did not un­
derstand what IM are doing. The IM representative replied that IM do not
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understand how M T/ GSE classify maintenance priorities to
(a) V.O.R. Vehicle Of the Road, which is awaiting one specific spare part 
to be operational; and
(b) V.I.P. Vehicle In Progress under routine maintenance in the workshops. 
D ia g ra m  15: The General Manager was surprised at the T l management’s 
perception of no clear communication with him. Their intention to communicate 
directly to the workshops was stressed.
D ia g ra m  16: Although the diagram suggests that the Maintenance Manager 
is at a centre of communication and he is satisfied with all his information 
channels, the General Manager wanted to know the status of communication 
with both IM and MT OPS departments.
The General Manager was impressed by the information provided by the 
diagrams and by their value as a basis for focussing discussion. He said “ I 
have le a rn t so m eth in g  new  ” . I immediately requested a one hour interview 
with him to get his perception of the problem areas in his organisation. He 
responded by offering me two hours and cancelled some of his other important 
commitments to give me an opportunity to get his views.
The interview took place one week later. The General Manager talked 
about very important issues related to how he managed and controlled his 
organisation. To interpret the data obtained into diagrammatic form took a 
considerable time because of the extent and detail of his stated concerns. Some 
of the more im portant issues are listed below.
1. One of the special projects manager’s responsibilities is to aid the mu­
tual understanding of problems and difficulties between MT/GSE and their
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customers.
2. The main area which needs better cooperation with M T/GSE customers 
is tha t of long term planning.
3. The General Manager does not trust the terminals planners because 
they have different and conflicting ideas.
4. Because of his many commitments, the General Manager finds it very 
difficult to fit every thing into his limited time. He also feels that the load on 
his managers is high.
5. The General Manager would like to see M T/GSE as an organisation 
selling its service to the rest of the airline ( independently or as a part of BA ).
I have interpreted the data obtained from the General Manager into Dia­
gram 17 which is a model of the perceived situations of his concern, specifically 
the status of communication and purposeful actions and the potential problem 
areas in his department. This, and the experience gained from the other dia­
grams, led to a point where I had to make a decision as to where all this was 
leading, and what was their problem?. I needed to be clear about this before 
any feedback of diagram 17 to the General Manager.
6.5 .3  W here to  Go from  Here?
It would be very useful at this stage to be able to give clear measures as to 
what success I had in stimulating the management group learning process and 
understanding their problems. There were in fact strong indications that these 
had taken place because:
a- the General Manager has devoted a considerable time to participate in
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the experiment.
b- the members of the management group have also contributed by pro­
viding a great deal of data, as used in building the conceptual models; and
c- communication between IM and M T/GSE had already improved to the 
extent tha t STOGK was no longer a serious issue.
The inquiry revealed the following ‘family’ of possible problem areas:
1. total data on occasions that M T/GSE customers have not been well 
served;
2. failures of communication of data and appreciation of purpose;
3. main requirements of M T/GSE for appreciation of shortcomings in the 
processes within M T/ GSE;
4. effect of top management decisions on ‘load’ on M T/GSE departments;
5. communication from outside M T/GSE to inside MT/GSE;
6. training functions in STOCK procedures.
All the above problem areas are issues which the General Manager and his 
deputy have to concentrate on in order to ‘resolve’ them. However, there was 
something tha t could be done in a form of a general DSS that could encapsulate 
all the above problems in general terms. In the discussion with the General 
Manager which was guided by diagram 17 ,1 proposed the idea of a system which 
would help the General Manager and members of his group to communicate and 
record key aspects of importance to their organisation, either individually or as 
a group. The details of the system are described in chapter 7.
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6.6 C onclusions
1. The research described in this chapter has indicated that the Bowen 
problem - formulation methodology is effective for its stated purposes [ see 
chapter 2 ]. The methodology involves the ‘problem owner(s)’ in the process of 
analysis to formulate their problem. This provides a rich picture about other 
possible problem areas.
2. The models developed using the notation which is devised by Bowen 
and extended here, are concerned with organisational m atters, with information 
flow and purposeful actions. They enhanced the managers’ understanding of 
major weaknesses in important links of communications and helped to identify 
where certain actions have to be taken. These models have received substantial 
support from all members of the client group.
3. The diagrammatic models helped also to change the nature of what was 
initially thought to be a problem. The ‘failure’ of the STOCK system became 
awareness of the lack of proper communication and control.
4. My application of the Bowen problem formulation methodology necessi­
tated the introduction of two very important symbols. These are the delay and 
the lack of both communication and purposeful actions. See figure 6.1. The 
rules for using these two new symbols are exactly the same ones which govern 
the use of both good communication and purposeful actions.
5. The ‘learning’ model (or game) turned out to be the OR process as it 
was practised by me. The OR process as a game has been discussed by Bowen 
(1978).
-  97 -
6. The management learning process was enhanced and the methodology 
acted as a framework for this learning; it related to the actual needs of man­
agement to reflect on their activities in a way that any conventional game could 
not. Importantly, it was dealing with current and changing activities as they 
arose.
7. The process of collecting data and building diagrams was difficult. I en­
countered the first three issues proposed by Bell (1985) [ see section 5.3.4 ]
during the course of the experiment reported in this chapter. However, the 
use of a structured method, namely Bowen’s problem formulation methodology 
has enabled me to overcome major difficulties in the process of structuring and 
feedback of data.
8. As a result of the interaction, the status of communication between 
M T/G SE and IM has improved considerably. Computer systems will be tailored 
to meet M T/GSE needs.
9. A proposal for a Decision Support System w e l s  accepted and is explained 
in detail in chapter 7.
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A B BR E V IA T IO N S
BA British Airways
IM Information Management Department
M T/G SE Motor Transport /  Ground Support Department
MT OPS M T/GSE Operations Department
V. and E. M T/GSE Vehicles and Equipment Department
Supplies BA Supplies Department with special responsibility to M T/GSE
M T/G SE Customers Terminals 1, 2, 3 and 4
Cargo Terminal 
Aircraft Engineering 
M T/GSE Operations 
STOCK Computer-Based Stock Control System
SERVE Serviceability of Vehicles and Equipment Computer-Based System
M EM /FOCUS/FIND Computer-Based Information Systems
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Figure 7.1. Notation
System
individual (also a system )
System and Subsystem
Potential conflict
0-0
n-o
O-HZ]o—o
Communication
O  Distorted communication
Purposeful action
Distorted purposeful action
No communication 
No purposeful action
General interaction or influence
■C> Delay in communication
Delay in purposeful action
Arrows are used to em phasise interactions
-100-
Diagram 1. The Environment
S E R V E
S T O C K
Information
M anagem ent
BA
( A ;
M T/G S E
Operations
Department
A = O perational R esearch  and Business Support Manager
B =G enera l M anager of M otor Transport/G round Support Equipment (M T /G S E )
G = P ro jec t Leader
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Diagram  2. The Problem  of Problem  - Formulation
Explicit rules for notation
Client system C o n s u l t a n t  
0
Explicit Explicit
Those using Formulations Formulation
Cs notation of problem of the problem
by Individuals by the Consultant
A is any individual client
P is my problem
P ' i s  the developing picture of thier problem
N ote:
This diagram is devised to “ ... encapsulate the essence of conducting the 
process of problem - formulation with a client group ” . [ See Bowen (1981a) ].
The logic behind the diagram was followed in the process of inquiry con­
ducted in chapter 7.
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Diagram  3. The Stores and Special Projects
Ind.
M T/GSE
C u s to m e r
Spares
Supplies
Supplies Dept. Individual
Workshop
Special
ProjectsStores
Maintenance Department
S T O C K S ER V E
Computer Systems
M T/G SE  
Systems Developm ent
Vehicles and Equipment Dept.
M T/G SE
BA
A =S to res  and Special Projects Manager
N ote:
This diagram is my interpretation of data obtained from the stores and 
special projects manager. The diagram indicated tha t the manager does not see 
any clear communication between M T/GSE and IM departments. His special 
projects role is not defined.
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Diagram 3. First Revise
BA
I n d .
MT/GSE
C u s to m e r
Maint.
Control
Supplies
Individual
WorkshopS to re s Special
ProjectsM aintenance Departm ent
S T O C K S E R V E
Computer Systems
/ V
M T/G SE  
System s Development
MT OperationsVehicles and Equipment Dept.
IM
M T/G SE
A= Stores and Special Projects Manager
N otes:
1. The manager considers MT OPS as an M T/GSE customer.
2. He believes that the stores are 98% efficient.
3. He is after the M T/GSE stock disposal programme.
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Diagram 4. The Stores Supervision
I n d .
S to r e k e e p e r
Stores
Supervision
Individual
Workshop
Computer Systems
Stores
Maintenance
M T/G SE
BA
N ote:
The senior stores supervisor believes tha t M T/GSE can run an in - house 
training course in computer systems provided tha t the IM department will 
update them on any enhancements of the current computer models.
-  105 -
Diagram  4. First Revise
Spares
Suppliers
Fuel
Suppliers
Supplies
Department
\y
Fuel Pumps
/  Ind. > 
Store­
keeper
Training
Group
Individual
Workshop
Stores \  
Supervision
Computer Systems
Stores
Maint.
MT/GSE
Engineering
Stores
BA
A= Senior Stores Supervisor
N ote:
The stores and special projects manager should have one role only because, 
as it is clear from the diagram, his deputy [ the senior stores supervisor ] is 
responsible for many functions in the department.
-  106 -
Diagram  5. The Union Representative
Ind.
S tore­
keeper
Stores ^  
Supervision
S T O C K
Stores
M T /G S E
BA
N otes;
1. Management do not recognise stores as a main service to the workshops. 
They are only concerned with the workshops output.
2. Aircraft Engineering stores have more facilities than the M T/GSE 
stores.
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Diagram  6. The M aintenance Control Department
Vehicles and 
Equipment Users
/ \
\ /
MT Operations
Individual
WorkshopS E R V E
M T/G S E
BA
A = Maintenance Control
N otes:
1. Maintenance control activities include; workshop loading, maintenance 
scheduling, individual vehicle costing, and administration.
2. The maintenance priorities are not clear.
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Diagram  7, M T /G SE  System s Developments
Computer
Companies
Systems
Development StoresProgrames 
Desired by 
M T/GSE
Systems
Develop­
ments Computer Users
S T O C K
MT/GSE
BA
N otes on D iagram s 7 and 7 F irst Revise:
1. M T/G SE will no longer need a stand - alone computer - based stock 
control system as IM started to modify the current STOCK system.
2. Customer support department is a progress chaser rather than a problem 
solver.
3. FIND is a software package which helps to find out aircraft schedules.
4. FOCUS is a software package which helps to produce meaningful reports.
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Diagram 7. First Revise
Outside Com panies
I n d .
TerminalsC u  a t  o m e r
\ f \/
Program s D esired System s
D evelopm ent
M T /G S E  S ystem s  
D evelopm ents Vehicles and  Equipment
IM (P ro jec ts )
_ y  Ind- 
Forw ard  
W orkshopCustom er Support 
D epartm ent
S tores
M aintenance
S E R V ES T O C K
F I N DF O C U S
C om puter System s
M T /G S E
Custom ers
BA
N ote : See diagram 7 for comments.
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Diagram 8. Senior Maintenance Engineer Building 470
Supplies
Provisioning
Vehicles and Equip.Maintenance
Control
Individual
WorkshopSt or es
Maintenance
S E R V ES T O C K
Computer Systems
MT/GSE
BA
N otes:
1. M T/GSE efficiency cannot be improved without major improvements
in the STOCK system.
2. Standardisation in vehicles and equipment is very difficult to achieve.
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N otes on Diagram s 9 and 9 First R evise
1. The S.M.E agrees with the stock disposal programme provided that 
there are some outside suppliers who are prepared to supply M T/GSE with 
spare parts whenever requested. However, he thinks that this is an unrealistic 
case, because their suppliers have their own priorities.
2. M T/GSE have no manual stock control system to back up the current 
computer - based one.
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Diagram 9. Senior Maintenance Engineer, Building 470 Extension
MT/GSE Customers
Supplies
Department
Stores Individual
Workshop
Maintenance
ST OCK SERVE
Computer Systems
MT/GSE
BA
Supplies
Stock to be Disposed Workshops
Stores
MT/GSE
Stock Disposed
BA
Stock Disposal Problem
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Diagram 9. First Revise
M T/G SE Customers
MT , 
Ops.
Vehicles & 
Equipment
Stores Individual
Workshop
Supplies
Department
Maintenance
S T O C K S E R V E
Computer Systems
M T/G S E
Engineering Stores
BA
Or
Stock to be Disposed
Stores
M T/G SE
îO
Workshops
\ /
Stock Disposed 
------------ i ---------
Supplies
BA
Stock Disposal Problem  
A = Senior Maintenance Engineer
B = Individual Operations Superintendent
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Diagram  10. Vehicles and Equipment Department
User Department 
(GOL/Eng/Cargo)
Supplies Vehicles and Equipment
S T O C K
Individual
WorkshopStores
Maintenance
MT/GSE
BA
A = Individual Store keeper
N otes:
1. Vehicles and equipment department is responsible for the procurement 
of new vehicles and equipment and replacement of old ones.
2. These vehicles and equipment have to be safe, cost effective and main­
tainable.
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Diagram 10. First Revise
User Department 
(G OL/Eng./Cargo)
Finance
Department
Standardisation
Programme
Supplies Vehicles and Equipment
S T O C K
Individual
Workshop
Stores
Maintenance
M T / G S E
BA
A = Individual Storekeeper
N otes:
1. The computer input requirements are too complicated for M T/GSE 
staff to understand.
2. Vehicles and equipment department is not responsible for any stores
problems.
3. The stores are not efficient to meet the maintenance requirements.
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D iagram  11. M T /G S E  O perations D epartm ent
Contractors
User
Department
Ind.
Store­
keeper
Individual
Workshop StoresM T/GSE
Operations
Supplies
Maintenance
Work Load 
Model S E R V E S T O C K
Computer Systems
M T / G S E
BA
N o te  :
MT OPS department objective is to provide an efficient motor transport 
for BA’s user department and for other airlines with whom BA has a handling 
agreement.
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Diagram 11. First Revise
Contractors
User
Department
Individual
Workshop
S T O C K
Stores
Supplies MT
Ops. Maintenance
Workload
Model S E R V E
Computer Systems
M T/G SE
BA
A= Individual Storekeeper
B- Individual MT OPS Superintendent
N o te  :
The MT OPS manager does not understand what the special projects 
role means [ see diagrams 3 and 3 first revise ].
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Diagram 12. The M T /G SE  Accountant
S E R V ES T O C K
Auditing
Department
Accounts
Department
M T/G SE
Computer Systems
Stores
Finance Department
M T/G SE
Department
BA
N otes:
1. There is no guarantee tha t the proposed stand - alone computer - based
stock control system will be efficient.
2. There is a very good response from IM department in case of any 
proposed modification in the STOCK system.
-  119 -
Diagram 12. First Revise
M.Control
S E R V ES T O C K
Veh. & 
Equip. Computer SystemsAccounts
Department
MT/G SE
Auditing
Department
Finance Department
Stores
Maintenance Department
M T/G SE
BA
N otes:
1. The current STOCK system is efficient but the problem is the distorted 
data in the system.
2. IM should allocate resources to train M T/GSE staff in the operations 
of computer systems.
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Diagram 13. The Supplies Department
Disposed
Stock
O D)
Stock 
to be 
DisposedOutside
Suppliers
g- cSpares
Supply
Maintenance Department
Supplies
Department S T O C K S E R V E
Computer Systems
M T/G SE
BA
N otes:
1. The department have reservations on most parts of the SSWG report.
2. M T/G SE staff do not understand many stock control terms.
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N otes on Diagram  14
1. Although IM are responsible for solving problems in the STOCK sys­
tem, the section working for M T/GSE do not have control over the software. 
Permission must be obtained from an other section to carry out any changes in 
the system.
2. IM say that, if M T/GSE can justify the f250000 to implement a stand 
- alone system, they will help them to get it right.
3. M T/G SE production system needs to be sorted out. They also have to 
concentrate on accident analysis.
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Diagram 14. The IM Department
Views
about
Production
System
Vehicles and Equipment 
Accident Analysis Programming
and
Analysis Group
Stores
S ta f f
Workshop
Staff
Implementation
and
Training Group
STOCK
Maintenance Department
MT/GSE
BA
Outside
Suppliers
■O Supplies
Dept.
BA
Spares
Priorities
Stock
Stores
Staff
Workshop
Staff
Maintenance
MT/G SE
S p ares  P rio rities  problem
-  123 -
N otes on Diagram  15
1. Contradictory views were expressed by Terminal 1 management because 
at one stage they said; “ We are not concerned with M T/G SE problems. We 
just want the number and pieces of equipment at the right time However, 
later they said; “ We need to understand M T/GSE problems and what we are 
doing to them and they need to understand what our problems are, and what 
they are doing to us ” .
2. One view perceived by Terminal 1 management was tha t possible im­
provements in the service might be achieved if the terminals and M T/GSE 
operate on a commercial basis where M T/GSE sells its service to them and 
they have the choice of buying some other service at a cheaper price.
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Diagram 15. An MT/GSE Customer (Terminal 1).
Special Projects
Individual
.Operator
MT Operations
Vehicles and Equipment
Equipment
Control
SERVEIndividual Workshop
Individual TerminalM T/G SE
BA
A= Proposed New Vehicles and Equipment 
B = Operational Vehicles and Equipment
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N otes on Diagram 16
1. One problem perceived by the M T/GSE deputy manager is that;
“ There is a lot of information available but there is no body who is actually 
collecting it and then presenting it in an easily d igestib le form ”
( my emphasis ).
2. Maintenance control department should be a part of the maintenance 
department, reporting to the maintenance manager rather than to the M T/GSE 
general manager.
3. The deputy manager thinks that 98.2% of stocked parts are provided at 
first requisition time.
4. When he was asked “ Why do the stores staff feel that they are left 
out? ” he replied: “ It is the same with M T/GSE maintenance staff, and it is 
a frustration to the management as it is to the staff. The reason for this is the 
wrong perception that the type of service provided by M T/GSE to BA is not 
as im portant [ to the top level management ] as that provided by the Aircraft 
Engineering department ” .
5. The deputy manager believes that; “ M T/GSE has to understand more 
fully their own needs and problems before criticizing any other BA department 
( such as IM ) for creating problems for M T/GSE ” .
6. The deputy manager is looking for; “ tools, methodology or computer 
systems which will help to perform his managerial tasks efficiently and commu­
nicate with other managers easily ” . He adds; “ I want something cheap and 
effective, something that we are all trained to use ” .
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Diagram 16. The MT/GSE Maintenance Manager
Individual
MT/GSE
Customer
Supplies 
, Dept. IM Department
Operational 
Veh.& Equip.
Maintenance
Control
Forward
WorkshopsLibrary
SER VE
Technical
Information
V&E.Dept.
Non­
stocked
PartsIndividual 
Base Workshop Stores
DepartmentOperations
Department
Base Workshops
Maintenance Department
MT/GSE Department
A=The Maintenance Manager (M T/GSE Deputy General Manager)
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Diagram 17. The MT/GSE General Manager
Outside
Organisations
Accounts 
k  Dept. Authorised
People
Individual
Customer
Vehicles and 
' Equipment 
DepartmentHumanResources
Special Projects
Training
Programmes
Union
RepresentativesVehicles Under 
Service
/  ln d . \  
W i t t e r )
Work\-=Xshops
Maintenance
Department
Spares Disposal 
ProgrammeMaint.
Control
Ops.
Dept.
STO CK SERVEMEM
Computer SystemsIM Department MT/GSE Department
BA
Supplies
Department
Views
About
M T / G S E
Top
Management
MT/GSE
Customers
Independent
Planners
) Vehicles and 
Equip. Dept.
Standardization
Programme
\/
Equipment
Replacement
Programme
Operational
Requirements
Service
Allocation
MT/GSE
BA
Perceived problems in MT/GSE
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CHAPTER 7
TOWARDS A DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM: AN EXPERIMENT
7.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the process of developing a computer - based deci­
sion aid for the General Manager of Motor Transport /  Ground Support Equip­
ment (M T/GSE) department. The aid developed was important because it was 
an indication of what was seen as needed as a result of the learning process, see 
chapter 6, and as an extension of that process.
During the process of the feedback of diagram 17 to the General Manager, 
and discussion of the potential problem areas outlined in section 6.5.3, it became 
clear that the General Manager found himself at a centre of communication, 
and yet keeping control was very difficult. The system is intended to enable the 
General Manager to save, add, and access information ‘relevant’ to his prime 
task as the top controller of the systems in his organisation.
Although the idea of the above system was first put to the General Man­
ager, I decided to find out the maintenance manager’s reaction to the idea 
because of his earlier interest in decision aids. See diagram 16.
I requested his reaction as to whether he was prepared to “ let other man­
agers at his level in M T/GSE know certain pieces of information and action in 
his departm ent that most easily get lost and are very often only known to him ”.
His reaction was that “ The other managers are interested only in the end
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product of (his) department, not in its problems He was also unwilling to 
record information for inclusion in a computer system because he was busy with 
so many tasks to perform and there would be no time to update the system.
I realised then that he was unsure about the likely consequences of such a 
system, and what I was begining to see as the overall needs of M T/ GSE, despite 
his evident concern with the complexity of his managerial task. Because of his 
ambivalence, and because I believed tha t the General Manager would cooperate, 
despite his considerable load, I decided to develop the outline of a system which 
would be a personal aid to him.
Following are the beisic characterstics of the system.
1. This would be to provide, primarily, for the General Manager of M T/ GSE 
departm ent, an interactive, adaptive computer - based information system 
which will enable him to record and access vital pieces of information about 
various activities inside and outside his organisation. The aim is not to replace 
any of the existing systems, but to develop one which will integrate with these 
systems in order to help the General Manager to communicate and control 
efficiently.
2. The idea was tha t the General Manager himself would develop and 
update the system, but would undoubtedly need an analyst’s support and ad­
vice. This would ensure a lea rn in g  p rocess for him about the system and the 
organisational matters implemented into it.
3. The decision for a personal aid was based on the problems of obtaining 
data, and the need for a strong venture across the department as a whole. 
If the system is implemented successfully it could be developed as an overall
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departm ental tool with certain privacy arrangements.
In choosing software and hardware, the intention was to find a system on 
which the above proposal could be carried out. The crucial reason for using 
accessible packaged software was to speed up the process of interaction in order 
to make use of the General Manager’s enthusiasm for the proposal.
The logical search was to start at the BA’s end. A brief inquiry revealed 
tha t the only possible system that can be used is the WANG OFFICE, which 
offers mail and messaging, time management, directory services and office file 
manager facilities. This system was implemented on the mainframe computer, 
but WcLS not to be available to M T/GSE until the middle of 1987. It could not 
therefore be used to test the proposal.
The search continued at the college and ended successfully with the choice 
of the SUPERFILE system [ see Southdata (1985) ] which was implemented 
on the RM Nimbus microcomputer. SUPERFILE is a database system which 
enables the user to store, add and access data quickly and efficiently. The user 
can easily make his own FORMS on the screen and enter, alter store and retrieve 
his information. It is available on both stand-alone and networked Nimbus 
computers. An IBM microcomputer version of the SUPERFILE system is also 
available which can be acquired and implemented on the IBM microcomputer 
already installed in M T/GSE department.
During the process of running the experiment which will be described in 
the following sections of this chapter, I became aware of some recent studies 
reported in the literature which examined the process of building a decision 
aid and the philosophy behind it. See section 7.3. No im portant discrepancy
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was found with the ideas which led to developing the system described in this 
chapter.
7.2 R unning The Experim ent
My broad understanding of the General M anager’s information needs which 
was based on the data interpreted in diagram 17, enabled me to produce two 
fictitious examples which are shown in figures 7.1 and 7.2. These were presented 
to the General Manager in a formal discussion. As anticipated, he expressed 
his interest and support, and agreed on a first real sample of his data to be 
examined and abstracted for the purpose of implementation on the computer. 
His willingness to give me access to his data was yet another indication to 
me tha t I was tackling issues which were of great importance to him. This is 
another subjective measure of the success of the problem - formulation stage 
already described in chapter 6.
The process of data reduction was very difficult because of the way the 
documents contained information ‘irrelevant’ to the General Manager. However, 
I was guided by the following principles in abstracting the data into, what would 
be, a meaningful information:
1. flexibility;
2. reasonable completeness;
3. personal nature;
4. simplicity.
The intended end product of the process, guided by the above principles.
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would be th a t the General Manager would have minimum information which 
will tell him;
1. what has been happening about a given issue X?
2. what network of communication is operating on X?
3. what key documents are available on X?
4. what departmental shortcomings are still unresolved and what live issues 
might they affect?
In order to update the General Manager on the progress achieved and the 
principles followed in data reduction, I forwarded discussion notes [ see annex 
to chapter 7 ] to him which gave him a summary of my involvement in his 
organisation. I also sent examples of information formats [ see figures 7.3 and 
7.4 which were abstracted from the General Manager’s real data ]. The General 
Manager recognised this as an excellent example of the type of information he 
needed in summarised form. He asked me to apply the same principles on 
further six channels of his information.
Further support for the above ideas was expressed by the Information Man­
agement (IM) Manager after a demonstration about the system, and he assured 
me of any help I required.
Having completed the forms of the further six information channels, I sent 
them  to the M T/G SE General Manager and wrote to him “ Enclosed are ab­
stracts ( thought to be information ) which might be useful for understanding 
situations in and outside M T/GSE ” . I added; “ The decision to implement 
the computer system I used, or any other accessible software to update and
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extend the information sample used for experimentation, will depend entirely 
on whether you find the above information useful or otherwise ” .
The General Manager acknowledged my efforts ( see letter following the 
discussion notes at annex ) and asked me to discuss some of the implementation 
difficulties with his computer systems advisor. The latter has agreed on an 
implementation programme.
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DEPARTMENT Operations Department
PROBLEM AREAS 1. Delays in transportation
2. Bad communication with the workshops
3. Reorganisation of work schedules 
Operations manager and his supervisors
1. To speed up the maintenance process in the workshops
1. To contact the supplies department
NEXT INTERACTION End of April 1986
Figure 7.1 Example of Problems Format
WHO IS INVOLVED 
ACTIONS
DATE
SUBJECT
OBJECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY
NOTES
15 march 1986
Systems Steering Group
To investigate X’s computer systems
X’s computer systems advisor /  Y department
The following issues will be investigated
1. Accident reporting system,
2. Stock control system
3. Workshop scheduling
NEXT INTERACTION August 1986
Figure 7.2 Example of Communication Format
ISSUE
DATE
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M T/ GSE communication meeting 
17 July 1985
PEOPLE INVOLVED M T/GSE Gen. Man. and Maintenance Man.
NOTES 1. Management is to set a T4 special working group
2. Management is to set an exibition of T4 equipment
3. Staff were to be provided with a list of intended 
procurement of vehicles
4. M T/GSE is to be involved in outside work 
NEXT INTERACTION 15 December 1986
Figure 7.3 Communication Information
SUBJECT
OBJECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY
PEOPLE INVOLVED
DATE
NOTES
M T/ GSE supervisors training course 
Designed to train M T/ GSE supervisors 
M T/GSE and BA training department 
M T/GSE engineers and MT OPS supervisors 
April 1986 to May 1987 
The course will cover:
1. M T/GSE role within BA
2. Control of the airline
3. Experience from outside companies
4. BA panel machinery
5. Dealing with BA customers
6. Instructional techniques
7. Discussion and feedback
Figure 7.4 Training Information
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7.3 Discussion and Conclusion
I had now reached a satisfactory situation where a learning process had 
been achieved and a decision aid, which will be a further learning process, 
accepted in principle.
The sucess of this research I had so far only been able to judge by client 
satisfaction and my own feel that things had gone very well. It also seemed that 
I had gone through a process which was very general in nature and could be 
repeated elsewhere. The principles I followed are clear. However, I had become 
aware in the course of this last phase of my work that some new studies had been 
reported in the literature. Earlier papers had only offered general ideas about 
information and decision aids. For instance Radford (1974) has pointed out 
“There is, as yet, no generally accepted theory regarding the use of information 
in organisations ” . Certain issues have to be considered in the development and 
implementation of any Management Information Systems (MIS). Questions such 
as:
- what kind of information is needed by what kind of people?
- how should information be produced and presented in an easily digestible 
form?
have to be answered as part of the process of building MIS.
The above points are widely debated in the literature and various ideas are 
reported concerning the building of ‘successful’ systems. ( Most of these are now 
generally thought of as DSS ). Ackoff (1967) developed certain concepts related 
to the development and implementation of MIS. His arguments were proved
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valid some twenty years later. For example, Ackoff’s emphasis tha t managers 
suffer from “ ... over abundance of irrelevant information ” , is taken as a basis 
for T argett’s (1985) ‘data reduction’ principle. Ackoff’s rejection of the view 
that managers do not need to understand the MIS is taken care of by Targett’s 
‘evolutionary approach’ in MIS design.
Targett (1985) has pointed out that traditional research in MIS has concen­
trated  on issues such as the design of software, the choice of hardware and the 
behavioural factors related to both the organisation and users. His experience 
in the design of one successful ( as he claimed ) MIS for a bank, led him to em­
phasize new directions for research and development of MIS. He recommended 
the following issues for successful computer - based MIS.
1. “ Analysis of the decision - taking system ” in order to find out infor­
mation requirements at different levels in the organisation.
2. “ An evolutionary approach ” in which users have the chance to ‘con­
firm’ or ‘deny’ the information produced by the system. This process will ensure 
users’ learning about the system and about their information needs ( his em­
phasis ).
3. “ D ata reduction” : this emphasizes Ackoff’s (1967) argument tha t man­
agers very often receive ‘irrelevant information’.
4. “ Data presentation ” to improve the MIS user’s recognition of the 
information.
5. The use of “ techniques of management science ” in order to transform 
data into information.'
W ithout then having knowledge of Targett’s work, the process which led
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to the direction emphasized in chapter 6 is consistent with Targett’s arguments 
outlined in points one through four above. The General Manager, for example, 
has participated in the most critical decisions such as the identification of the 
information he wants to be implemented in the system. Data was reduced by 
considering flexibility, reasonable completeness, personal nature and simplicity. 
As far as my earlier stages of inquiry were concerned the General Manager 
has acknowledged that he has le a rn t a great deal about his organisation. It 
should also be borne in mind that the early stages of the inquiry [ see chapter 
6 ] ensured tha t management as a whole had been involved in an examination 
of what their problems actually were. It would have been easy to have spent 
time unnecessarily trying to replace one of the central computer systems, that 
governed stock control, on which concern was originally centered, instead of 
moving towards a DSS.
Aother support for the process outlined in chapters 6 and 7 came from 
Espejo and W att (1986). In their paper, they argued for a new understanding 
of the concept of ‘Information Management (IM) ’. By IM, they mean “ ... how 
skillfully and efficiently the individual manager or groups of managers use the 
information sources or resources available to them ... (to) convert information 
into effective action ” . Espejo and Watt have devised and tested three strategies.
“ S tra te g y  O ne - Adjustment to the Organisation structure They view 
organisation structure as a collection of ‘filters’ and ‘amplifiers’. Through the 
former, information is reduced and channelled to the manager. The amplifiers 
are used to convey the manager’s ‘intended actions’ to different units in his 
organisation. Espejo and W att’s experience shows that adjustments to both
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‘filters and amplifiers’ will result in more effective information management. It 
is relevant to say here that as a result of my intervention in BA’s M T/GSE and 
IM departments, certain organisational adjustments have already taken place. 
One of the reasons behind these adjustments is to improve the organisation 
effectiveness.
“ S tra te g y  T w o - The Design of Organisational Conversations ” . This strategy 
is designed to “ ... increase the chance of meaningful commitments, to increase 
the chances of coordinated action and to increase the chances to learn from the 
inevitable breakdowns ” . The ideas behind the experimental system outlined in 
this chapter and its purpose coincide with the philosophy of Strategy Two. Such 
a system will enable the M T/GSE management group to obtain and update 
information about issues such as; what problems exist in department X?, what 
issues do any manager need to understand and take action in department 
X?, .... etc. This will certainly increase communication and commitment, and 
hence, will reduce the chances of ‘breakdowns’.
“ S tra te g y  T h ree  - Manager - t o -  tasks Fit ” . This strategy is based on 
the philosophy that the manager, using his ‘mental model’ of situations of his 
concern, has a limited ability to ‘attenuate’ data and ‘amplify’ actions. Any 
process which may lead to the design of a model(s) to aid the manager, should 
take into account making ‘explicit’ the manager’s perception of situations under 
his control. W hat was reported in chapter 6 is a successful stage in the above 
sense which led to the logical need for the system developed and outlined in 
chapter 7. The use of Bowen’s problem formulation methodology proved to be 
a successful process which is acknowledged by the clients since it made them
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aware of the complexities of their tasks.
Other ideas about MIS, also consistent with my development, are discussed 
by Checkland and Griffin (1970), who adopted a systemic view in developing 
MIS. Their main emphasis is not the technical aspects of the MIS, but the 
‘problem - oriented’ issues. Huber (1982) has discussed problems such as ‘mod­
ification’ and ‘delay’ tha t affect the communication of information.
It must be emphasized that the MIS as a model designed to aid the man­
ager’s understanding of situations of his concern and to reduce uncertainty 
about events, suffers from the well defined ‘implementation gap’ of all models. 
See chapter 3 for further details. In particular Argyris (1977) haa pointed out 
the following reasons for the implementation gap:
1. “ MIS were not well understood by line management ” . This is in fact 
in total agreement with Ackoff’s (1967) assertion. It is one of the reasons, I 
believe, for the initial perception of M T/GSE management group tha t their 
STOCK system was not functioning properly.
2. “ Top line management was not involved in persuading and selling the 
use of MIS to the users in the organisation ” . This was true for the M T/ GSE 
system and was overcome by the proposal outlined in chapter 7.
3. “ MIS specialists and line managers did not understand each other’s job 
requirements, perspectives, and pressures ” . This again is true in my study. 
See diagram 17, especially the distorted communication between M T/G SE and 
IM.
The following points summarise the work described in this chapter.
1. The successful application of Bowen’s problem formulation methodology
-  141 -
and the diagrams documented in chapter 6, has led to the recognition tha t the 
M T/ GSE General Manager can better manage and control his department if he 
has better organised and ‘relevant’ information ( specified by him ) from both 
inside and outside his organisation. Many of his decisions are influenced by the 
quality of this information channelled through each link shown in diagram 17.
2. A computer - based information system was developed for the General Man­
ager with his full support and participation. It helped him to record and access 
essential features of current problems and communications about these. The 
experience gained from the process of the system’s development will be very 
useful in developing any DSS for the department as a whole. However, the 
different information needs by different managers in the department have to be 
considered in any such development.
3. The ideas behind the development of the system and the inquiry outlined in 
both chapter 6 and 7 are consistent with recent research work which is reviewed 
above.
4. Once again the model provided is a learning ‘game’ in the broadest sense, to 
be used as part of an on - going process.
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A N N E X  TO  C H A P T E R  7
D iscu ssio n  N o tes: prepared as an internal departmental note and used as a 
hand - out for discussion at a formal M T/GSE meeting.
1. This is neither a progress report nor a final recommendations of the finding 
of my research on the sort of processes and systems M T/ GSE has to implement. 
The report’s main aim is to generate a discussion in my forthcoming interaction 
with the M T/G SE General Manager.
2. During the course of my analysis to M T/GSE ‘problems’ and needs, I was 
influenced by:
a- the ideas of Professor K.Bowen whose problem formulation methodology 
I used;
b- my interactions in M T/GSE and IM;
c- ideas reported in the literature about Decision Support Systems (DSS) 
and Management Information Systems (MIS).
However, the following is by no means a comprehensive coverage of the 
literature or what I have heard from the key people I met.
3. Because of the direction my research has taken, particularly after the in­
teraction with M T/G SE management group and because of various limitations 
(e.g. time and technical ), it is important to stress the fact that my current 
purpose is not to develop a DSS nor a MIS, but hopefully ( with management 
cooperation ) to test the following hypothesis:
Given
a- managers;
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b- computer systems;
c- operational environment ( e.g. M T/GSE ),
how can one integrate these effectively into an information processing sys­
tem whose outputs are:
a- ‘be tter’ management and control which hopefully leads to; 
b- ‘be tter’ decisions which hopefully leads to;
c- the operational environment operating efficiently and effectively, e.g.; 
‘b e tte r’ service standards provided by M T/GSE to the rest of the airline.
4. Although there are various ideas about ‘what DSS are?’ [ see chapter 5 ] 
they generally are one of the following:
a- systems designed to facilitate decision processes;
b- systems tha t support rather than automate the decision making process; 
c- systems tha t can respond quickly to the changing needs of decision mak­
ers;
d- systems tha t provide useful information at the top managerial level.
[ See Alter (1980) and Bonczek, Holsapple and Whinston (1981) ].
The question;
- whether M T/GSE management group needs a DSS?;
- in what areas?; and
- what software /  hardware is required?
is not the subject of this report. It is certainly an issue which needs further 
technical and conceptual research.
5. Recent research in this area concentrates on the issue of “ How skillfully and 
efficiently the individual manager or groups of managers use the information
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sources and resources available to them. ... to convert information into effective 
action ” . See Espejo and Watt (1986) who have suggested the following three 
strategies:
1. “ Adjustments to the organisational structure
2. “ The design of organisational conversations
3. “ Manager - t o -  task fit 
Their research also concentrates on:
- the matching of the m anager’s limited information processing capabilities 
( input needs attenuation );
- m anager’s information output needs amplification.
Another researcher [ see Targett (1985) ] proposed the following issues 
which appear to be crucial to the success of the MIS particularly in the design, 
development and implementation phases:
1. “ Analysis of the decision - taking system
2. “ An evolutionary approach
3. “ D ata reduction
4. “ D ata presentation
5. “ Techniques of management science ” .
6. Consistent with the logic provided in the above five points, a sample of the 
M T/G SE General Manager’s information input has been taken and includes 
courses /  training and the task force 1985 data. The data has been reduced 
into what is thought to be information necessary for the General Manager and 
fed into the computer in a way that can be amended easily. I was guided by
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the following principles in transforming the data into information:
1. flexibility;
2. reasonable completeness;
3. personal nature;
4. simplicity.
The im portant step now is getting minimal information requirements that 
would be useful for the General Manager to be implemented into the computer 
and updated by the General Manager. This will help to identify the relevance 
( or otherwise ) of the proposed system and the information for the General 
Manager and perhaps his view of the relevance to the management group as a 
whole.
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BRITISH A irw ays
Mr S Dakhel
Royal Holloway College 
Department of Mathematics 
Egham Hill 
Egham
Surrey TW2 0 OEX
P O  B ox 6
L o n d o n  (H e a th ro w )  Airport North  
H o u n s l o w ,  M id d le s e x  TVV6 2JR
T e l e p h o n e :  0 1 - 7 5 9  5 5 1 1  
T elegram s:  Britishair
JG/sm 7 92 
29 July 1986
Dear Sabah
Thank you very much for your discussion notes which I 
found very interesting and a good summary of your work, 
have passed the comments to Brian Maskell, who is our 
Computer/Systems expert and his comments are on the 
attached letter.
I think now, to get things working practically, you will 
need to have a meeting with Brian to discuss some of the 
difficulties. I have copied this letter to him. Would 
you like to ring him direct on 562 7761.
Yours sincerely
/J/\ JOHN GIBBONS
Manager MT/GSE
C.C. Brian Maskell
B r it is h  A irw .iv s  I’l l .  
K i'm s l iT i 'd n l lH f :
S |H > f ( ib i r ( i  H o u s o .
H c . i l h r r m  A ir()i> rt L o n d o n i  
H m in s ln v v  T \ \  h  \  
R c i t i s l r 'f c i i  in  h n s i l . in d  \ n .  I:
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Because the research described in the preceding chapters of this thesis could 
not be sensibly reported except as a whole, it has not yet been possible to bring 
out a published paper. However, one paper, appendix A, which is submitted 
for publication in the European Journal of Operational Research, was 
presented at the Eighth European Conference on Operational Research ( EURO 
VIII ), Lisbon, Portugal, September, 1986. This paper summarises some of the 
material in this thesis, and some of the conclusions of this research: this had 
to be drafted quickly and was done by Professor Bowen as a second author 
working from my records and working notes. However, for completeness, I shall 
restate these findings and outline important implications for further research.
1. As stated in this thesis [ see chapter 2 ], OR analysts may need to deal 
with ‘messy’ problems, which are heavily influenced by qualitative factors. To 
formulate these problems, there is a need for structured methodologies, such as 
the Bowen problem formulation methodology [ see chapters 2 and 6 ].
2. The research carried out in this thesis has indicated that the Bowen problem 
formulation methodology, is effective for its stated purposes. In my work, I 
applied it in a different environment from that in which it was originally tested, 
and it was the first consultant - client application of the methodology.
The use of the methodology has an important prerequisite: knowledge of
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the significant features of the systems and subsystems relevant to the study. 
This includes both technological and organisational aspects tha t influence the 
effectiveness of a particular system. This prevents narrowing the scope of the 
inquiry to a specific direction at an early stage in order to search for a ‘quick’ 
solution ( possibly by fitting a mathematical model to the wrong problem ).
I developed, using the methodology, models which represent managers’ 
perceptions of their task difficulties and the problems of their concern. These 
models were revised and put into a more useful form in the course of communi­
cation with their ‘owners’. The diagrammatic models enhanced the manager’s 
understanding and appreciation of major weaknesses in im portant links of com­
munications, and they helped to identify where certain actions had to be taken. 
T hat these models have received substantial support from all members of the 
client group is a measure of the success of the intervention and the effectiveness 
of the methodology. Further, the discipline of the methodology, and its struc­
tural properties, enabled a ‘student’ experimenting for the purpose of his thesis 
to become quickly accepted as a ‘consultant’.
As a side issue, I added two elements ( the delay and lack of communication 
and purposeful action ) to the symbols used. Because of the importance of the 
notation being simple and generally relevant, I discussed these additions with 
Professor Bowen. I did not add them until I had convinced him that their 
inclusion met the conditions he had laid down in Bowen (1983).
3. It can be said with confidence tha t the evidence provided by the experience 
of chapters 6 and 7 supported the proposition, stemming from chapters 2, 3,
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4, and 5, that what managers need are models which enable them to reflect on 
the way they manage process and not those which simulate that process.
4. The models developed in chapter 6 which are consistent with the logic of 
point 3 above, helped to change the initial feel of management that their main 
problem was a major weakness in their computer information systems. They 
became aware of the lack of communication and control, which are central to 
the process of management.
5. There is no need for a gaming process in the traditional form if a satisfactory 
learning process can be achieved as part of a process of intervention. In the 
intervention reported in chapter 6 of this thesis, the first ‘learning’ model ( or 
game ) turned out to be the OR process as used by me. The OR process as 
a game has been discussed by Bowen (1978), but the use of the process as a 
learning ‘game’ has not been clearly emphasised before.
6. The results of this study support the argument developed in chapter 3, that 
the problem owners’ participation in the process of building any models as part 
of an inquiry into ‘problem - situations’, will increase the likelihood of success­
ful implementation. Models should be simple, flexible, and reasonably 
complete. ( It was apparent during the interactions tha t the information not 
explicit in the models, but shared by the ‘owners’ and in part by the analyst, 
were satisfactory although ‘incomplete’ to an outsider ).
7. Point 6 above is supported by the experience of chapter 7 in which, as a 
result of the management learning process and participation, a decision aid
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was provided for the top - manager of the part of the organisation I served. 
This system should help him to integrate scattered pieces of information about 
various activities inside and outside his department. In other words, it will act 
as a ‘diagnostic facility’ which will help him to discern where things are going 
wrong or starting to go wrong, and what actions might be taken to get them 
right.
8. This decision aid ( MIS or DSS ) is a second type of learning process in 
two stages. First, its development requires the manager involved to reflect on 
the detail of the information he needs in filling the data store and in updating 
etc. Second, it can be used to play through the information in the course of the 
days work as a memory aid. And third, it can accept the learning gained by 
modifications to the system, which can be done by the manager or, if he wishes, 
with the aid of an analyst.
9. The processes that I have gone through successfully in an industrial 
management environment are based on principles taken from a wide range of 
subject areas, and it has proved possible to merge these coherently in the context 
of seeking ways to provide ‘good’ learning models.
10. Based on the above conclusions many recommendations for further research 
can be identified.
a. Effort is needed to develop a computer graphics software to enable the 
diagrammatic notation used in Bowen’s problem formulation methodology to be 
easily processed. The task of providing adequate diagrams is time - consuming
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and the ability to try out possible descriptions of people’s perceptions quickly, 
or to modify diagrams quickly is important.
b. M athematical developments could be introduced to enable questions to 
be more easily posed about the diagrams produced e.g. whether the rules have 
been properly applied, whether interactions not shown should be investigated 
and soon. Ideas could be borrowed from areas such as set theory, graph theory 
and others. However, this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis.
c. It could be very useful to examine the possibility for developing certain 
models of the STOCK system as devices for lower levels of management and 
for key operatives. These would be learning games of the type mentioned in 
chapter 4, by the BA Operational Research and Business Support Manager.
d. It would be valuable to use the Bowen problem formulation methodology 
to inquire into problems of communication and control in other selected areas 
( e.g. in British Airways ), irrespective of there being a perceived problem.
e. Finally, and more specifically, further developments of the decision aid 
outlined in chapter 7 are required to examine its potential advantages for imple­
m entation as a device for communication and control for a management 
group ( such as Motor Transport /  Ground Support Equipment (M T/GSE) 
departm ent of BA ).
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A bstract
This paper stems from a research enquiry into models which could be used in an inter­
active manner for exploring managers’ needs. During the early stages which concentrated 
on the learning process, the concept arose that what managers want are models which allow 
them to reflect on the way they manage process and not those which simulate that process. 
In a small part of a large organisation, a study was made of the perceptions of a hierarchy of 
managers, and other key individuals, of their roles, their essential communication channels 
and the problems they faced. Because of the structuring and feedback process used, this 
proved to be the first stage of a learning process for the managers and also, of course, for 
the researchers. The second stage was to provide a computer-based system for the recording 
of and access to essential features of current problems and communications about these: it 
was to be a planning schedule and process control held in common by a management group. 
The account given is of work in progress towards a management aid, or decision support 
system - of this type.
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1.Introduction
This paper describes some aspects of a current PhD study by the first author. It 
has been drafted from his material by the second author who is supervising the study. It 
concentrates on practical research carried out in a large organisation and is an inquiry on 
behalf of managers, and with managers, seeking ways to improve management control. For 
convenience, the paper uses ”we” : in practice it has been an interaction between managers 
and the first author, with the second author intervening at important ’political’ stages in 
the total process.
The study started with the intention to examine learning ’games’ and to seek criteria 
for judging these. At an early stage, it was realised that any models used in the learning 
process were games as defined in [1]: a further shift occurred when, after a survey of the 
literature on ’learning’ and ’management’ games, it became apparent that while there was a 
great deal that referred to the p ro cess  in an organisation, there was very little that related 
to the control of that process by senior management. The question then became ”what is 
the learning process of managers that enables them to adapt and retain control of a process 
which they do not directly involve themselves in, except by managing those who do?”
Such a question could not be studied in theory. Ideas could only be tested and developed 
in a real environment. We were fortunate in finding hosts who were interested in the basic 
aims of the study and willing to cooperate, trading the time of managers (a precious resource) 
for our research of their managerial environment.
We gratefully acknowledge their role in the research we now describe.
2. The Environm ent
Two departments of the organisation were primarily concerned, although we were given 
considerable freedom to talk to key people elsewhere.
Department X, our main client group, was responsible for all scheduled maintenance 
and emergency repairs of some 3000 vehicles and related equipment of varied, and sometimes 
highly specialised, types. Their aim was to ensure high availability of vehicles as required 
by the customers who were part of the overall organisation.
Two computer systems were available to them to handle stock control and vehicle and 
equipment serviceability and availability. These were developed by Department Y, who were 
responsible for all computerised information systems used by the organisation.
The situation, when we came in, was that management’s primary concern was with  
the suitability and performance of the computer systems. Our initial enquiry was to some 
extent conditioned by this concern, but, as we told them, our research interest would take us
3.
into wider reaches of their management process. The sort of issues we had in mind included 
seeking answers to the following questions:
who uses the computer models and with what results, satisfactory or adverse?
how and from what sources does information come to managers?
do they expect advance warning of customer dissatisfaction?
what control is management able to exercise over the operational process and how?
how did management become aware of the need for an internal study (recently put in 
hand) of computer systems performance?
how do management plan to stop things going wrong (prevention or rapid cure)? e.g. 
by learning from earlier shortcomings and by better understanding of interactions that could 
lead to shortcomings.
3. M ethodology
We had already decided to use a problem formulation methodology [2], and its dia­
grammatic notation, that had not yet been tested in such an industrial setting, and to 
concentrate initially on the broad structure of internal and external communications and d a t  
f lo w . T his concentration was recommended as a result of experimental work [3] carried 
out with a university teaching group as clients: the value of such initial study had also 
been partially supported by the results of a demonstration given to a group of methodology 
researchers with one of their number as a client (his problem was concern with his own 
process of consultancy using a different methodology).
It was very evident, from documents provided initially (to give us a feel for the ac­
tivities of the departments and the roles of the hierarchy of management), that there were 
contradictory views as to why the stock control system was not functioning properly; we 
planned to get independent perceptions about this and about widder issues from a number 
of those involved. In the end, as our relationship with our clients blossomed, we were able 
to seek views from relatively junior members of Department X and from customers, as well 
as those of many senior people in both departments, including all managers.
Because we needed to build a number of diagrams of perceived system structures and 
inter- and intra-system interactions (communications, data-flows, etc) for later discussions 
with management as a whole, we asked if all interviews could be tape-recorded, and used 
freely (inside the departments) apart from any statements specifically said to be "for our 
ears only” . This was readily agreed: the group as a whole prided themselves on the openness 
with which they conducted affairs, and we found as we progressed that such openness was 
indeed very real.
A.
4. The F irst Round
Interviews took place with the following people, members of Department X unless 
otherwise stated:
The Stores Manager (who had a second managerial role cls the main interface with 
customers when problems arose);
his Senior Stores supervisor;
a storekeeper;
a manager in Department Y, with specific responsibility for computer systems support 
to Department X, and his senior analyst/programmer;
two Workshop Senior Maintenance Engineers;
the Vehicles and Equipment (V & E Manager);
the Operations Manager;
a Systems Development Engineer (a link-man between Departments X and Y, working 
under the V & E Manager);
the Accountant in the Finance Department, responsible for Department X affairs; and
the Maintenance Control Manager.
the Spares/Maintenance Support Buyer (Supplies Department).
We had not up to this point, interviewed the General Manager or his deputy (also Main­
tenance Manager), nor had we met any of the customers, although the view was expressed 
that the Operations Manager, was, in effect, a customer.
However, because interest was growing, questions, which were difficult to answer simply, 
were being asked about what we were doing. Also we needed some discussion on the relevance 
of our analysis. A first formal group meeting was held, those present being the authors, the 
Deputy General Manager, the Stores Manager, the V & E Manager and the Maintenance 
Control Manager.
Diagrams representing the expressed views of th e ‘t h ir t e e n  in t e r v ie w e e s ,  some h a v in g  been 
revised by feed-back sessions with them, were presented. A brief preamble explained the 
notation, in part a coding system for qualitative data - some of them had already seen a 
paper giving fuller details. Examples of the diagrams, which relate to interviews referred 
to later, are shown in Figures 1 to 3 as illustrating the sort of data being presented. The 
notation is shown in Figure 4.
Some interesting aspects of discussion, largely between themselves, were:
the ease with which they used the diagrams to aid discussion;
5.
the seriousness with which they took individual differences of perception, as reflecting 
partial or particular views based on responsibilities and expertise;
the difficulties faced by some staff in knowing exactly to whom they should respond;
the somewhat anomalous position of the Operations Manager;
the nature of their links with Department Y (it W cis noted that steps were being taken 
to improve communication - see below)
the disagreements with the views of one of the Senior Maintenance Engineers, while 
accepting that his h a v in g  such  v ie w s  had to be recognised.
Additionally, there was discussion on the different categories of communication (formal 
reporting; informal; semi-formal in meetings). Things of interest to them were emerging, 
and they agreed that we should continue and extend our enquiries.
We then went through a similar process with the manager in Department Y. A senior 
adviser to the organisation as a whole (through whom we were introduced to the two depart­
ments) also attended this session. It was at this stage that we came to realise that the stock 
control issue was no longer a central one, and that, by just being there asking questions 
(nothing to do with our methodology), we had influenced communication between the two 
departments (in exactly what way we cannot be sure, and perhaps it would eventually have 
improved anyhow). The most encouraging outcome of this meeting for us was the senior 
adviser’s interest. He said that he had learnt a lot about the organisation and problems 
of the two departments in a very short space of time; indeed, he had learnt things that he 
felt he should have known before. The diagrammatic notation and the process of its use im­
p r e s se d  him as a tool that could have much wider use in the organisation. He thought that 
a computerised method of using it could be of great value.
5. The Second Round
And so we went on to have further sessions with all participants, revising and extending 
the diagrams; there were additional interviews with
the Maintenance Manager (Deputy to the General Manager); and
two Senior Managers in one of the Customer Groups.
the Supplies Department Manager.
This culminated in a formal presentation using chosen diagrams to the General Manager 
of Department X. This meeting was also attended by two of his senior managers, and by 
his key links with Department Y, with Supplies and with Finance. Without going into 
detail, the General Manager was impressed by what he heard and by the way in which the 
discussion was focussed by the diagrams. One phrase he used was ”I have learnt something
6.
We requested that he now be interviewed and asked for an hour of his time. He offered 
us two hours and cancelled some other appointments to give us an early o p p o r tu n ity  to  
question him.
We were now moving towards a point when we had to make a decision aa to where all 
this was leading. It was certainly exciting everyone (especially ourselves) but where was it 
taking us? And what was the problem?
6. W here to go from here?
One direction would have been to reinterview, to establish in some detail what went on 
in all the communications and other interactions. What was certain was that, when we were 
ready to discuss our analysis of the General Manager’s picture with him, he would properly 
expect to have a clear exposition of what we now intended. We had accepted, mainly as a 
result of comment by the Deputy General Manager, that the diagrams themselves would not 
be suitable as a central feature of management aid, although at one time we had had this 
in mind. What seemed to be wanted was some record, possibly one held in common by all 
managers, and in th e ir  language, that would enable them to access the various important 
bits of information that stemmed from both formal a n d  informal communication.
We tried to persuade the Deputy to keep a diary for a few weeks and note his key bits: 
he had indicated that with his wide spread of links (in his role as Maintenance Manager), 
it was not easy to maintain control everywhere. However, he felt that he had insufficient 
spare time to do this. Despite the fact that he had just spent a relaxed two hours discussing 
our ideas, we realised that a formal on-going commitment was not a welcome ’extra’ for a 
busy man, and such concentration (even for a limited period) could be both w o rry in g , 
even threatening.
So we decided to put the general idea of a decision support system, as described above, 
to the General Manager, one that the first author would structure using, in the first place, 
key files that the Manager would specify. The aim would be simplicity and flexibility: the 
principle would be that eventually he would construct his own required formats for data 
and be solely responsible (he or his secretary) for updating and adapting as time passed and 
emphases changed.
7. Serving the General M anager
The interview and feed-back sessions with the General Manager proved to be most 
constructive. He rapidly centred his thinking, when faced with his most complex communi­
cation network, on his inability, despite good intentions, of getting around to everyone. He 
was also very conscious of the difficulties of getting a clear resume of key issues and actions
7.
to be taken, particularly when in a hurry, which wais a normal state of affairs.
In short, he was enthusiastic when we proposed our as yet untested ideaa. He asked us 
to go ahead and assured us of his cooperation.
Our own constraints were a further pressure towards something simple. The first author 
had only a limited time to get to a definitive stage, since his main task was the completion 
of his doctoral thesis. We therefore warned the General Manager that we certainly could 
not contemplate any development of an overall departmental tool (which would also have 
to incorporate privacy arrangements) and it was agreed that we would aim merely at estab­
lishing the feasibility and acceptability (to the General Manager) of a personal management 
aid, but one which could be developed for wider use among department managers in due 
course.
8. Software, H ardw are, and the Chosen Form ats
Issues of compatibility of the computer system to be adopted with existing and future 
systems in the organisation, and the need for a lot of the work to be done at the College, 
were thoroughly investigated.
The final choice was the SUPERFILE system implemented on the RM NIMBUS mi­
crocomputer. An IBM microcomputer version of the SUPERFILE system is also available: 
it can be implemented on the IBM system which the organisation uses. The actual formats 
produced are of course very specific to the General Manager’s manifold responsibilities and 
these and the sort of data they would contain are confidential. The type of format is given 
in the fictitious exmaples of Figures 5 and 6.
The problems of introducing the system have been discussed with Department Y and 
with the General Manager’s computer systems adviser. An implementation programme has 
been provisionally agreed.
9. Sum m ary of M ajor Research Points
1. The Bowen problem-formulation methodology proved to be effective for its purposes:
(a) exploration of mangers’ problems;
(b) provision of a focus for communication between analyst and managers;
(c) provision of an effective tool for recording the essential features of interviews (pri­
marily communication and organisational perceptions); and
(d) stimulating discussion between members of the overall client group.
2. The discipline of the methodology and its structural properties enabled a relatively 
unpractised researcher to attain rapidly, in the eyes of management, the status of an ac­
ceptable consultant. The original arrangement was that they were helping a student with a
research programme, but this perception of the first author’s role lasted no longer than the 
period up to the first formal presentation
3. The ’’learning” model (or game) turned out to be the OR process as it was practised 
by us. The OR process as a game has been discussed by Bowen [1], but the use of the 
process a.s a learning process has not been so evident before.
4. The initial feel of management that their computer systems were the central feature 
of their problem soon disappeared. They came to focus on the process of management, as 
we had predicted.
5. A model of the process centring on their stock control and vehicle serviceability 
and availability might well be useful as a learning device for more junior staff. Part of the 
management process is concerned with such training programmes.
6. The move towards a simple and manager-operated information system seems to be 
something that was a ’seen’ need, but it had never been pressed - perhaps because it seemed 
trivial? What we have done, and how we have done it, seems to be in good accord with  
work by Targett [7] and by Espejo and Watt [4], and, although not so directly, in accord 
with Espejo’s cybernetic approach [6]. Our ideeis, however, were independently developed. 
We have also studied work by Checkland and Griffin, Ackoff, Radford, Hubber, Argyris and 
many others, without observing any essential incompatibility.
7. We observe that, in this case and probably very many others, managers do not have 
a planned process for reflecting on their own management and control, whereas they have 
many experts who study the more mechanical processes and lower level control processes in 
their departments. Similar findings come from recent research by Moynihan [6] in military 
and business areas and from current research by him in a transportation environment (not 
yet reported).
8. Finally, we note that there are many methodologies, apart from the one we have used, 
which would probably be equally, albeit differently, effective in the early inquiry stage. The 
important thing is the ultimate provision of a tool which puts managers into the driving seat 
without the need for constant analyst intervention, and we believe that we are en route to 
achieving this. We would like, eventually, however, to see the problem-formulation process 
available on computer, so that it can also be used by, rather than for, clients.
9. The second author has adopted (as yet in pencil and paper form), the concepts of 
the simple format approach as a management aid for his academic and research activities. 
He finds himself, even at the present primitive stage much more efficient and in control. He 
intends to extend this usage and become a micro-computer owner.
9.
DEPARTMENT Operations Department
PROBLEM AREAS 1. Delays in transportation
2. Bad communication with the workshops
3. Reorganisation of work schedules
WHO IS INVOLVED Operations manager and his supervisors
ACTIONS 1. To speed up the maintenance process in 
the workshops,
2. To contact supplies department.
NEXT INTERACTION End of April 1986
Figure 5. Example of Problems Format
DATE 15 March 1986
SUBJECT Systems Steering Group
OBJECTIVE To investigate X's computer systems
RESPONSIBILITY X's computer systems advisor/Y department
NOTES The following issues will be investigated
1. Accident reporting system
2. Stock control system
3. Workshop scheduling
NEXT INTERACTION August 1986
Figure 6. Example of Communication Format
F ig u re .  1 Y DEPARTMENT
Views about Y
Programming
and
Analysis group
Stores
S taff
Workshop
Staff
Implementation
and
Training groupStock computer system
Maintenance
The Organization
o
MaintenanceStock
The Organization
Stores
Staff
Users
Workshop
S ta ff
Outside
Suppliers
Supplies
Dept. Spares
Priorities
Spares priorities problem
Figure 2  MAINTENANCE D EP A R T M E N T
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Figure 3. X DEPARTMENT
Accounts 
k  Dept.
Authorised
People
Individual
Customer
Vehicles and 
EquipmentHuman Res.
Outside
Organ. Special projects
Training
Programmes
Union
representatives• Vehicles Under 
Service
In d . )  
F i t t e r ;
Work shops
Spares Disposal 
ProgrammeMaint.
Control
Ops.
Dept. Maintenance
Stock ServeMem
Computer Systems
The Organization
Supplies
Department
X's
Customers
Views  
About X
Top
Management
Independent
Planners
) Vehicles and 
Equip. Dept.
Standardization
Programme
Equipment
Replacem ent
Programme
Operational
Requirements
Service
Allocation
The Organization
Perceived problems in X
Figure 4  NOTATION
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